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I. INTRODUCTION
The secondary mortgage market stands on three legs. The first
leg, created in the early 1930s, is made up of government
instrumentalities like the Federal Housing Administration (the
FHA) and the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie
Mae). The second leg, which was created in the 1930s and took off
in the 1970s, is made up of public/private hybrids like the Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). The third leg,
which was created in the 1970s but did not take off until the
1990s, is the private-label market which is made up of private
companies that package mortgage-backed securities that have no
guarantee, explicit or implicit, from the federal government. Each
of these legs buckled during the Great Recession.' This Article
primarily addresses the buckling of the first leg, but in broad
historical context.
Today's FHA suffers from many of the same unrealistic
underwriting assumptions that have done in so many other
lenders during the 2000s.2 It has also been harmed, like other
lenders, by a housing market as bad as any seen since the Great
Depression. As a result, the federal government announced in
I See generally KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. McCoy, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS:
RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2011) (addressing the failure of
the private-label market); David Reiss, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of
Federal Housing Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, 61 ALA. L. REv. 907 (2010)
(addressing the failures of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
2 "Underwriting" refers to the process of evaluating the likelihood that the principal and
interest due on a loan will be repaid. Mortgage lenders typically consider the three "Cs"
when underwriting: credit reputation, capacity, and collateral. Credit reputation is often
summarized by a credit score. Capacity evaluates the borrower's existing debt as a
proportion of her income, as well as accounting for other factors such as savings. Collateral
evaluates the property to determine whether the lender can recoup what it is owed if the
borrower fails to pay back the loan. See FREDDIE MAC, The 3 Cs of Underwriting Factors
Used in Loan Prospector's Assessment, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/au-works/facto
rs.html (last visited May 29, 2016).
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2013 that the FHA would require the first bailout in its history.3
At the same time that it has faced these financial challenges, the
FHA has also come under attack for the poor execution of some of
its policies to expand homeownership. Leading commentators
have called for the federal government to stop employing the FHA
to do anything other than provide liquidity to the low end of the
mortgage market. These critics' arguments rely on a couple of
examples of programs that were clearly failures, but they fail to
address the FHA's long history of undertaking comparable
initiatives.4 This Article takes the long view and demonstrates
that the FHA has a history of successfully undertaking new
homeownership programs. At the same time, the Article identifies
flaws in the FRA model that should be addressed in order to
prevent them from occurring if the FHA were to undertake similar
initiatives in the future.
This Article first provides a basic introduction to the FRA. Part
II then sets forth the dominant critique of the FHA. Relying on
often overlooked primary sources, Part III provides a textured
history of the FHA and charts its ever-changing roles in the
housing-finance sector. Part IV concludes that the FHA can
responsibly address objectives other than the provision of liquidity
to the residential mortgage market.
The Article brings together the scholarly literature regarding
the history of race and housing policy as well as the economics
literature regarding the role that down payments play in the
appropriate underwriting of mortgages in order to give a more
detailed picture of the federal government's role in housing finance
for low- and moderate-income households. It ultimately proposes
that FRA homeownership goals should be more explicitly tied to a
rational underwriting process, one that is designed to make sure
that people can afford their mortgages over the long-term. This
improved underwriting process would both protect the financial
3 Margaret Chadbourn, U.S. Federal Housing Administration to tap $1.7 bln in taxpayer
funds, REUTERS, Sept. 27, 2013, http://reuters.com/article/usa-housing-bailout-idUSWINOG
702P20130927.
4 See generally infra Part III.B.5, III.B.9.
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health of the FHA and ensure that new homeowners are able to
afford their homes for the long term-that is, become sustainable
homeowners.
The FHA has a storied history, notwithstanding its many
problems. The New York Times noted in 1934, the year that the
FHA started up, that there "is no New Deal agency which is being
more widely discussed behind the scenes in Washington these days
than the Federal Housing Administration. It is no secret that
President [Franklin Delano] Roosev[ellt holds the highest hopes
for this housing program... ." Nearly fifty years later, a
Commission on Housing, appointed by small-government-
proponent President Ronald Reagan, praised the FHA even while
calling for extensive reforms:
Few pieces of social invention from the 1930s have
reverberated so loudly through the corridors of time as
the FHA-insured, level-payment, self-amortizing, long-
term mortgage. Supplemented by VA mortgage
guarantees after the war, this piece of paper and its
acceptance-first by homebuyers and banks, later by
insurance companies and an organized secondary
market-made homeownership possible for tens of
millions of Americans who would otherwise have lived
out their days in rented quarters.6
Frank L. Kluckhohn, Housing Programs Give High Hopes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1934,
at E6. See also Thomas W. Phelps, Cheap Housing Is Broadest Socialistic Step New Deal
Has Proposed - Amount Undecided, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1934 ("Decision of the Roosevelt
Administration to provide the underprivileged masses with housing they can't afford under
private capitalism is philosophically just another triumph of human values over property
values.").
6 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON Hous., THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
HOUSING, at xxiv (1982), http://www.huduser.org/portal/Publications/pdfHUD-2460.pdf.
Indeed, one recent unpublished study, Matthew Chambers et al., Did Housing Policies
Cause the Postwar Boom in Homeownership?, 5-7 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 18821, 2013), found that the thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage popularized by the
FHA accounted for a significant portion of the increase in homeownership in the United
States during the middle of the twentieth century. But see John L. Goodman, Jr. & Joseph
B. Nichols, Does FHA Increase Home Ownership or Just Accelerate It?, 6 J. HOUS. ECON.
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Mortgage insurance is a product that is paid for by the homeowner
but that protects the lender if the homeowner were to default on
the mortgage. The insurer pays the lender for the losses that it
suffers from any default and foreclosure by the homeowner. 7
The FHA provides mortgage insurance on mortgage loans for
single-family homes and multifamily buildings; it "is the largest
government insurer of mortgages in the world."8 Like much of the
federal housing infrastructure, the FHA has its roots in the Great
Depression. 9 The private mortgage insurance (PMI) industry, like
many others, was decimated in the early 1930s. 10 Its companies
began to fail as almost half of all of the mortgages in the nation
defaulted." The PMI industry did not revive until the 1950s. 12
184, 184 (1997) (concluding, in a relatively short-term longitudinal study, that "to the extent
that FHA has any influence on homeownership, it is mostly to accelerate home purchase,
not to enable it among households that otherwise would never be able to buy").
7 MARSHALL W. DENNIS & THOMAS J. PINKOWISH, RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LENDING:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 153 (5th ed. 2004).
8 FED. Hous. ADMIN., ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 3 (2010), http://
www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/ffiafylOannualmanagementreport.pdf. The FHA also insures certain
healthcare facilities and manufactured housing. Id. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/RCED-97-93, HOMEOWNERSHIP: POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF REDUCING FHA'S INSURANCE
COVERAGE FOR HOME MORTGAGES 16 (1997), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/rc97093.pdf
(listing the country's primary mortgage insurers and noting that the Section 203(b) Single-
Family Mortgage Insurance Program is the FHA's primary program).
9 The Federal Home Loan Bank System was authorized under the Federal Home Loan
Bank Act of 1932. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, 47 Stat. 725 (1932).
The Home Owners' Loan Corporation was established by the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation Act of 1933. Home Owners' Loan Corporation Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 37-43,
48 Stat. 128 (1933). The Federal National Mortgage Association (now known as Fannie
Mae) was initially created to establish a secondary market for FHA-insured loans in 1938
by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. David Reiss, The Federal Government's
Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick up
the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1029 n.30 (2007). There were some antecedents that predated
the Great Depression. Congress established the Federal Farm Loan System in 1916 which
offered "relatively long-term, amortized mortgages with equal payments throughout the
loan term. No parallel system was set up for nonfarm residential loans, however." PRICE V.
FISHBACK ET AL., WELL WORTH SAVING: How THE NEW DEAL SAFEGUARDED HOME
OWNERSHIP 13 (2013); see also Kenneth A. Snowden, The Anatomy of a Residential
Mortgage Crisis: A Look Back to the 1930s (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 16244, 2010) (discussing federal housing finance infrastructure of the early twentieth
century).
10 See infra Part III.B.1.
1 See infra Part III.B.1.
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The idea for a government alternative to private mortgage
insurance came from the National Emergency Council as part of
its proposal to address a broad array of problems in the real estate
sector. 
13
One of the key programs to arise from this proposal was a
system of federally-financed mortgage insurance, the FHA.14 The
FHA proposal was incorporated into the National Housing Act.
The FHA was
charged with the duty of encouraging improvement in
housing standards and conditions by making improved
credit facilities available to the owners and prospective
owners of homes and other property. In accordance
with the National Housing Act, it extends Government
support by means of credit insurance covering private
credit transactions. Hence, in achieving the desired
results, chief reliance is placed upon private capital
and initiative.15
The FHA's first full year of operation was 1935.16 The FHA
initially insured mortgages originated by private lenders that were
(1) short-term repair loans; (2) long-term mortgages for single-
family home loans (which actually covered buildings with one to'
four units);17 and (3) mortgages for large multi-family projects.18
The FHA's goals for insuring residential mortgages were to make
"a sounder investment for the lender" and to extend "the
,2 See infra Part IV.B.3.
13 Arthur M. Weimer, The Work of the Federal Housing Administration, 45 J. POL. ECON.
466, 466-67 (1937). Weimer was an economist at the FHA from 1934-1937.
14 Id.
15 FED. Hous. ADMIN., FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION
3 (1935) [hereinafter FIRST ANNUAL REPORT].
16 FED. HOUS. ADMIN., SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING
ADMINISTRATION 1 tbl.1 (1936) [hereinafter SECOND ANNUAL REPORT]. FHA began insuring
a small number of loans in August of 1934, and its rate of growth was exponential through
the end of 1935. Id. at 2, Chart 1.
17 For a discussion of the meaning of "single family," see infra note 63.
18 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.
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practicable range of borrowers and of home-mortgage loans."19
Over time, Congress gave the FHA a variety of additional policy
mandates that were intended to help the federal government
achieve other policy goals. These goals ranged from supporting
the war effort during World War II to increasing the number of
minority homeowners during the early 2000s. 20
Although conventional wisdom says that the FHIA had one
mission during the Great Depression-increasing liquidity-it
actually had many missions. 21 After its second full year of
operation, the FIA set forth the following nine missions:
1. To expedite recovery in the building and allied
industries.
2. To aid and encourage private capital
investments in the home-mortgage field.
3. To secure a more uniform flow and wider
distribution of home-mortgage funds.
4. To secure a lower and more uniform interest
rate on home-mortgage securities.
5. To improve mortgage-lending practices.
6. To raise building standards.
7. To protect the owners of small homes.
8. To encourage the creation of private limited-
dividend companies to finance housing
developments for persons of low income.
.9 Id. at 3.
20 See infra Part III.B.
21 See, e.g., Richard K, Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical
and International Context, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 95 (2005) ('The combination of HOLC
[Home Owners' Loan Corporation] and the FLA represented a piece of early 'financial
engineering' that allowed illiquid financial institutions to become liquid again."); Anthony
Pennington-Cross & Anthony M. Yezer, The Federal Housing Administration in the New
Millennium, 11 J. HOUS. RES. 357, 358 (2000) ('The original purpose of FHA as part of the
economic recovery program was to restore mortgage lending and fill the gap created by the
failure of private mortgage insurance.').
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9. To develop essential statistical and economic
data on real estate and housing.22
These goals ranged broadly from the oft-cited liquidity rationale,
to supporting industries relating to housing, to consumer
protection. The FHA's role in reducing systemic risk was also
explicitly acknowledged early in its history. In the FHA's second
annual report, the Administrator notes that it was initially
designed to "help to stabilize the whole real-estate market; to give
warning of the periods of inflated prices when many families are
apt to purchase homes with small equities; and to help maintain
an orderly home real estate market during periods of
depression. '23
Over its lifetime, the FIA has insured over 40 million
mortgages, helping to make home ownership available to a broad
swath of American households. 24 The overwhelming portion of its
resources is devoted to one to four unit houses. 25 And indeed, the
FHA mortgage was central to America's transformation from a
nation of renters to homeowners. 26 The early FHA really created
the modern American housing finance system, as well as the look
and feel of postwar suburban communities. 27
The FHA has also had many other missions over the course of
its existence and a varied legacy to match.28 Beginning in the
22 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 1-2.
23 Id. at 6.
24 DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE
FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE FHA MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND FISCAL YEAR 2014, at
60 (2014). The FHA has also insured tens of thousands of multifamily and healthcare
projects. FED. HOUS. ADMIN., ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 5 (2013),
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=ffiafyl3annualmgmntrpt.pdf.
25 FED. HouS. ADMIN., supra note 8, at 6 (noting that such loans account for 86.3% of its
insurance-in-force).
26 KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 205 (1985).
27 Id. at 205, 215.
28 Some acknowledged this early on. See, e.g., MILES L. COLEAN, THE IMPACT OF
GOVERNMENT ON REAL ESTATE FINANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 150-51 (1950) (noting that
housing finance policy "was used to accomplish ends not strictly germane to the credit
1028 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1019
1950s, the FHA's role changed from serving the entire mortgage
market to focusing on certain segments of it.29 This changed
mission had a major impact on everything the FRA did, including
how it underwrote mortgage insurance and for whom it did so.30
In recent years, the FHA has come under attack for its poor
execution of some of its attempts to expand homeownership, and
leading commentators have called for the federal government to
stop assigning such mandates to the FHA.31 They argue that the
FHA should just focus on providing liquidity for the portion of the
mortgage market that serves low- and moderate-income
households.32 These critics rely on a few examples of programs
that were clearly failures, but they do not address the FHA's long
history of undertaking similar initiatives. These critiques
sometimes seem to reflect an anti-government ideology more than
a particularized critique of the FHA itself because the arguments
are so broad that they would apply to many other government
programs as well. This Article takes the long view and
demonstrates that the FHA has a parallel history of successfully
undertaking new mandates. 33 At the same time, it identifies
operational failures that should be addressed in the design of
future initiatives. 34  In particular, it proposes that the FHA
transaction, such as the improvement of housing standards, the influencing of land
planning, and the regulation of wages paid to construction workers").
2 See infra Part III.B.3.
30 See infra Part III.B.3.
31 See, e.g., JOSEPH GYOURKO, AM. ENTER. INST., RETHINKING THE FHA 1 (2013) (arguing
that the FHA has failed to achieve key policy goals and should ultimately be terminated);
EDWARD J. PINTO, AM. ENTER. INST., HOW THE FHA HURTS WORKING-CLASS FAMILIES AND
COMMUNITIES 41 (2012) (arguing that the FHA uses "practices that result in a high
proportion of families losing their homes").
32 See PINTO, supra note 31, at 41 ("[T]he FHA needs to return to its traditional mission
of being a targeted provider of mortgage credit for low- and moderate-income Americans
and first-time home buyers.").
33 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HOUS., supra note 6, at 162 ("FHA has performed an
important role as an innovator over the years, successfully gaining market acceptance for
new types of home mortgage instruments.").
34 Make no mistake, the FHA has been dogged by complaints of every day operational
incompetence and venality for much of its existence, but this Article does not focus on these
more pedestrian problems of the type faced by nearly every government instrumentality at
one time or another. For examples of these more pedestrian problems, see FHA Indicts
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undertake a rulemaking that requires it to balance the goal of
broad access to credit with the need for households to be able to
make their mortgage payments over the long term. The FHA
needs to achieve this balance in order to protect the financial
health of itself and its borrowers alike.
II. THE FAILURES OF THE FHA
The FHA is an understudied topic despite having a massive
impact on the built environment of the United States. 35 This lack
of scholarship is particularly unfortunate because it has had some
serious failures that mar its long history of success as a provider of
liquidity, stability, and access to the residential mortgage market.
Because of those failures, the leading commentators on the FHA
have indicted its initiatives to encourage homeownership. The
Eight for Fund Misuse, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1939; George E. Cruikshank, Housing Report
Calls FHA Activities in 1946-'50 Full of "Corruption;" Ousted Aide is Main Target, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 13, 1954, at 2; FHA Concedes Office Can't Keep up with Mortgage Requests, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 7, 1954, at 8; Emanuel Perlmutter, 18 Arrested Here in 5-Million Fraud in
Housing Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1961, at 1; Richard F. Janssen, FHA Reappraisal:
Housing Agency Strives to Curb Criticism of Some of Its Operations, WALL ST. J., July 1,
1963, at 1; Six Concerns Charged with Fake Applications for U.S. Home Loans, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 10, 1965, at 9; Former FHA Chief in Philadelphia Named in 2 U.S. Indictments, WALL
ST. J., May 12, 1972, at 2; Edward Foldessy & Timothy Shellhardt, Backing Off. Lenders
Sharply Cut Writing of FHA Loans as Red Tape Mounts, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1973, at 1.
There have also been a number of studies about operation deficiencies at the FHA. See, e.g.,
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-542, FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION:
IMPROVING DISPOSITION AND OVERSIGHT PRACTICES MAY INCREASE RETURNS ON
FORECLOSED PROPERTY SALES (2013); GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-15, FEDERAL
HOUSING ADMINISTRATION: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN RISK ASSESSMENT AND HUMAN
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2011); NAT'L CTR. FOR HOUS. MGMT., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON IMPROVING THE OPERATION OF FEDERALLY INSURED OR FINANCED HOUSING PROGRAMS:
VOLUME 1: SINGLE-FAMILY HOUSING 3-28 (1973).
35 Modern comprehensive studies of the FHA may be counted on one hand. See
Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 21, at 358 (noting the variety of purposes the FHA
serves); Kerry D. Vandell, FHA Restructuring Proposals: Alternatives and Implications, 6
HOUS. POLY DEBATE 299, 301-33 (1995) (providing a detailed history of the FHA and its
accomplishments and failures). There are many articles that address narrow aspects of the
FHA's performance. See, e.g., Marsha J. Courchane et al., The Downs and Ups of FHA
Lending: The Government Mortgage Roller Coaster Ride, 24 J. HOUS. ECON. 39, 41-43
(2014) (providing review of recent FHA literature).
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absence of a vibrant scholarly exchange regarding the FHA stands
in the way of responsibly charting its future course.
Robert Van Order and Anthony Yezer, the authors of the FHA
Assessment Report, write that "the lesson that we should take
away from" the FHA's recent history of looser underwriting
standards is that the "FHA, as currently organized, should not be
used as an experimental program to encourage homeownership."3 6
However, they further note that this is nonetheless unavoidable
because "there are powerful political forces willing to push FHA to
allow very unsound lending practices."37 Given that Yezer is the
co-author of one of the handful of comprehensive studies of the
FHA, this is a damning assessment indeed.38
The few policy analysts who make a close study of the FHA
agree in the main with Yezer and the other scholars who have
given the FHA their sustained attention. The American
Enterprise Institute's Edward Pinto, the author of the FHA Watch,
writes that, "Government insurance programs suffer from three
fundamental flaws: (1) the government cannot successfully price
for risk; (2) government backing distorts prices, resource
allocation, and competition; and (3) political pressure and
congressional demands for a quid pro quo inevitably arise,
politicizing the programs."39 Housing economist Joseph Gyourko
36 ROBERT VAN ORDER & ANTHONY YEZER, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY CTR. FOR
REAL ESTATE & URBAN ANALYSIS, FHA ASSESSMENT REPORT: THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL
HOUSING ADMINISTRATION IN A RECOVERING U.S. HOUSING MARKET 9 (2011), http://busine
ss.gwu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/FHA2011Q2.pdf.
37 Id.
38 See Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 21, at 357-58.
39 EDWARD J. PINTO, AM. ENTER. INST., TRUTH IN GOVERNMENT LENDING IS LONG OVERDUE
(Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.aei.org/article/economics/fmancial-services/housing-finance/truth-
in-government-lending-is-long-overdue/. See generally Mark Calabria, Fixing Mortgage
Finance: What to Do with the Federal Housing Administration? (Cato Inst., Briefing Paper No.
123, 2012), http://www.cato.org/publications/briefing-paper/fLxing-mortgage-finance-what-do-fe
deral-housing-administration (arguing the FHA has no net benefit and should be
"eliminated"). See also Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 21, at 370 ("Since the 1940s,
FHA has had programs targeted to housing finance needs of specific groups: veterans,
residents of urban renewal areas, service personnel, residents impacted by military bases, and
residents of rehabilitation projects. The sheer number of programs enacted suggests that the
ability to support such efforts appears to be a politically attractive feature of FHA.'). David
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is more succinct, but equally pessimistic: the FHA "has failed by
any reasonable metric."40
Much data exists to support these characterizations of the FHA,
but I will demonstrate that they cherry-pick from the historical
record to make their case, focusing on disastrous policies of the
early 1970s and the 2000s. By failing to address the FHA's other
initiatives over its eighty years of operation, these commentators
fail to make a convincing case that the FHA's history is a history of
failed government action.
Commentators are greatly concerned that the FHA will face
high losses because of its supposed divergence from its original
mission. These losses look like they will be measured in the
billions of dollars in the medium term. 41 Robert Van Order and
Anthony Yezer's policy prescription for the FHA is "that over time
the FHA should revert to its previous role: helping first-time and
low- to moderate-income homebuyers purchase homes, allowing
the private sector to shoulder more of the risk associated with
insuring larger loans."42 Van Order and Yezer, like many other
commentators, tend to focus on just one aspect of the FHA's
original mission-providing liquidity to a frozen market-and
bestow it with an essential quality: this is what the FHA truly is
about. But the historical record is much more complicated, both at
the FHA's origin and over the course of its long history. This is not
to say that concerns about the FHA are unfounded: there is great
reason to be concerned for the financial health of the FHA.
Mn, recently of the Center for American Progress and consistently at odds with Pinto on
housing finance policy, also agrees that the FHA needs major reform although he has not yet
set forth why. See David Min, What Should Replace Fannie and Freddie? (PowerPoint
presentation given at the American Enterprise Institute, Jan. 25, 2011), http://S3.amazons.
com/Zanrah storage/www.aei.org/files/2011/01/25/Min.pdf.
40 GYOURKO, supra note 31, at iii. Gyourko further argues, "Not only is its main
mortgage insurance guarantee fund insolvent in the sense that it does not have sufficient
capital resources to cover expected losses, but it is also failing far too many of its intended
program beneficiaries in helping them achieve sustainable homeownership." Id.
41 See infra text accompanying notes 48-52 (discussing the financial situation of the FHA).
42 VAN ORDER & YEZER, supra note 36, at 2.
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Empirical studies bear this out. Housing economist Joseph
Gyourko demonstrates that the FHA's reserves became precarious
soon after the Great Recession. 43 In 2011, Gyourko wrote:
For the past two years, it has been in violation of its
most important capital reserve regulation, under
which it is supposed to hold sufficient reserves against
unexpected future losses on its existing insurance-in-
force. To be barely compliant with this rule would
have required just over a $12 billion capital infusion in
fiscal year 2010, and that presumes that future losses
are not being underestimated by FLIA. This report
suggests that they are by many tens of billions of
dollars, so that the recapitalization required will be at
least $50 billion, and likely much more, even if housing
markets do not deteriorate unexpectedly. 44
Another study by Diego Aragon and others was consistent with
Gyourko's findings. It found that the Mutual Mortgage Insurance
(MMI) Fund's rapid growth since 2007 has led to major losses,
with its reserves dropping from $15.8 billion to $2.73 billion from
2008 to 2009. 45 The same study estimated that "[a]bsent new
revenues from future books of business, the recent annual audit
estimates that the [FHA's] capital ratio is down to 0.53 percent,
below its required 2 percent level."46 The Aragon study identified
various warning signals that indicated that funding will in fact be
necessary.47
43 Joseph Gyourko, Is FHA the Next Housing Bailout? 1 (Am. Enter. Inst., Working Paper
No. 2011-06, 2011).
41 Id. But see Sarah Rosen Wartell & John Griffith, Too Early to Sound the PHA Alarm,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/housing/re
port/2011/12/12/10787/too-early-to-sound-the-fha-alarm/ (arguing that Gyourko and others
have exaggerated FHA's losses).
45 Diego Aragon et al., Reassessing FHA Risk 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 15802, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15802.
16 Id. at 2, n.3.
47 Id. at 2-3. The warning signs were: (1) many FHA-insured borrowers owe more than
their house is worth; (2) FHA-insured homes are worth significantly less than the FHA
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Although the FHA denied that it would need additional funding
after the Gyourko study was released, the critics turned outeto be
right.48 The FHA received a nearly $1.7 billion infusion from the
Treasury in 2013.49 Also, the FHA's single-family mortgage
guarantees made between 1992 and 2012 will have "a net federal
budgetary cost of about $15 billion.... ."50 Indeed, actuaries have
estimated the economic value of the main FHA program to be
negative $13.5 billion in 2012.51 This estimate was expected to
improve over time, and in fact it has, but this was a financial low
for the FHA.5 2 There is no question that these policy critiques and
believes them to be; (3) FRA ignores negative information about currently delinquent
mortgages and improperly underwrites its streamline refinanced mortgages; and (4) many
FHA-insured borrowers were able to put down effectively no money for their purchase
because they can finance FHA's up-front premium and because first-time homebuyers were
eligible for a tax credit that offset the expenditures made to purchase the house. Id.
48 Raphael Bostic, The Continued Strength of the FHA, THE HUDDLE (Nov. 18, 2011),
http://blog.hud.gov/index.php/2011/11/18/continued-strength-fha/ (providing HUD's rebuttal to
Gyourko's study by then-HUD Assistant Secretary for Research and Policy Development).
-9 FED. HOUS. ADMIN., supra note 24 (noting in the unpaginated A Message from the
Commissioner that "FHA was required to take a mandatory appropriation of $1.68 billion
from the U.S. Treasury to close its FY [fiscal year] 2013 books"). Note that the FHA has
also sent billions of dollars to the Treasury's general fund pursuant to the Federal Credit
Reform Act and, furthermore, that accounting for the FHA's budgetary impact is not so
straightforward. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FAIR-VALUE ESTIMATES OF THE COST
OF SELECTED FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS FOR 2015 TO 2024 (2014); CHAD CHIRICO &
SUSANNE MEHLMAN, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FHA's SINGLE-FAMILY MORTGAGE GUARANTEE
PROGRAM: BUDGETARY COST OR SAVINGS? (2013), http://www.cbo.gov/publication/44628;
JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42632, BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF FEDERAL
CREDIT (DIRECT LOANS AND LOAN GUARANTEES): CONCEPTS, HISTORY, AND ISSUES FOR THE
112TH CONGRESS (2012).
50 CHIRICO & MELLMAN, supra note 49, at 1.
5' INTEGRATED FIN. ENG'G, INC., ACTUARIAL REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING
ADMINISTRATION MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND FORWARD LOANS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012, at i (2012) (excluding FHA reverse mortgages). Since 1990, the MMI Fund's financial
health "has been assessed by measuring the Fund's economic value - its capital resources
plus the net present value of future cash flows - and the related capital ratio .. " GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-671T, MORTGAGE FINANCING: ACTUARIAL SOUNDNESS OF THE
FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION'S MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND 2 (2002).
52 The MMI Fund had an estimated negative value of $7.9 billion in 2013. INTEGRATED
FIN. ENG'G, INC., ACTUARIAL REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MUTUAL
INSURANCE FUND FORWARD LOANS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, at i (2013) (excluding FHA
reverse mortgages). Id. (excluding FHA reverse mortgages). The MiMI Fund had an
estimated positive value of $5.93 billion in 2014. INTEGRATED FIN. ENG'G, INC., ACTUARIAL
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budgetary concerns must be addressed to chart a responsible
course for the FHA going forward.
III. THE ROLE OF THE FHA IN THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE
MARKET
The FHA's role in the mortgage market can best be understood
as "a specialized insurance company that guarantees the payment
of mortgages made by private lenders (banks and other mortgage
lenders) who provide loans to developers and homebuyers."53 The
FLA was created in 1934, at a time when the mortgage market for
one to four-family homes was split among individuals and other
non-institutional lenders; commercial banks; mutual savings banks;
savings and loan associations; and life insurance companies. 54
While savings and loans associations had a significant share of the
market and pretty attractive terms, other types of lenders offered
much less consumer-friendly products. 55 Commercial lenders, for
REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND
FORWARD LOANS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014, at i (2014) (excluding FHA reverse mortgages).
53 FED. Hous. ADMIN., ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 3 (2007), http://
www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/fhafy07annualmana gementreport.pdf.
54 LEO GREBLER ET AL., CAPITAL FORMATION IN RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE: TRENDS AND
PROSPECTS 207 tbl.55 (1956). For a good review of the literature about the housing market
preceding the Great Depression, see Chambers et al., supra note 6, at 5-6 (describing the
importance of commercial banks after 1913, the changed structure of mortgages, and the
lack of federal regulation in the residential housing market).
55 GREBLER ET AL., supra note 54, at 231 tbl.66. More than 90% of savings and loan
(S&L) mortgages were amortized, and many of those were fully amortized. Id. Fixed terms
were, however, significantly shorter than those of FHA mortgages. See COMMS. ON FIN. &
TAXATION, HOME FINANCE AND TAXATION 26 (1932) (report of The President's [Hoover]
Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership); B.H. McCormack, FHA Has Shown
Banks Amortization Practice Is Best Policy for Home Owners' Mortgages; Several Federal
Requirements Are Criticized, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1938, at 5 (describing advantages and
disadvantages of FHA Title II loans). S&Ls had a 39% of the market for one to four family
homes from 1925-1930. GREBLER ET AL., supra note 54, at 207 tbl.55. One commentator
noted that there "had been a trend toward a gradual liberalization of mortgage credit terms
(interest rates on loans, length of contract maturities, and loan-to-value ratios) from 1920 to
1934, but in 1935 [the FHA's first full year of operation] the change was greatly
accelerated." R.J. SAULNIER, URBAN MORTGAGE LENDING BY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
43 (1950). Before the 1930s, S&Ls were often referred to as building & loan (B&L)
associations. Jonathan Rose & Kenneth A. Snowden, The New Deal and the Origins of the
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instance, typically required a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 50% to
60% of the property's market value, with a term of three to five
years. 56  These mortgages typically required a large balloon
payment at the end of the term, a payment that almost always
required the borrower to refinance. 57 But even savings and loans
associations required relatively low LTV ratios and relatively short
terms.5
8
The housing markets faced problems in the Great Depression
that were similar in kind to those faced in the late 2000s. These
Modern American Real Estate Loan Contract 1 n.2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 18388, 2012). Rose and Snowden describe innovations in the building
and loan industry from the 1880s through the 1930s. Id. at 1-3. For a contemporary view
of the real estate finance industry in the 1920s, see RICHARD T. ELY & EDWARD W.
MOREHOUSE, ELEMENTS OF LAND ECONOMICS 207-33 (1924).
56 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 27. Life insurance mortgages were similar.
A large, albeit not representative, study of single-family mortgages originated by life
insurance companies found that the LTV was typically between 40%-65%. SAULNIER,
supra note 55, at 43 n.6. To be sure, savings and loan associations were much more likely
to originate fully amortizing loans than commercial banks before the FHA was created. See
GREBLER ET AL., supra note 54, at 231 tbl.66 (displaying the distribution of amortized loans
from 1920-1947). Mortgages from thrifts could differ in some meaningful ways from the
modern standard mortgage. FISHBACK ET AL., supra note 9, at 101 (describing how
traditional B&L loans "did not truly pay off the principal each month, instead allowing
borrowers to buy equity shares in the B&L"). See generally Chambers et al., supra note 6,
at 5-7 (reviewing mid-twentieth century market share and contract terms of various types
of lenders).
57 See Dwight M. Jaffee & John M. Quigley, Housing Policy, Mortgage Policy, and the
Federal Housing Administration, in MEASURING AND MANAGING FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISK
97, 105 (Deborah Lucas ed., 2010) (discussing the default rates and liquidity problems of the
1930s). The FHA was created pursuant to the National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48
Stat. 1246 (1934). See also FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 3 ("A large proportion
of the institutions, representing millions of small savings depositors, were not able because
of law or tradition, or both, to make mortgage loans of more than 50 or 60 percent of the
appraised value, whereas the most urgent demand is for first mortgages of from 60 to 80
percent of the appraised value of the property."); GREBLER ET AL., supra note 54, at 207
tbl.55 (noting that commercial banks had a 14% market share from 1925-1930 and
individuals and other non-institutional lenders had a 26% share).
58 COMMS. ON FIN. & TAXATION, supra note 55, at 25-26 (noting that savings institutions
limited their mortgages to 40% to 60% of the appraised value and that long term mortgages
typically had terms of eleven to fifteen years). Many borrowers ended up getting second
mortgages with much less attractive terms to make up the difference if they were short of
equity. Id. at 9-11. The report noted that "Experienced mortgage men... indicate that the
greatest deterrent to sound home ownership may be found in the second mortgage field."
Id. at 28.
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problems include rapidly falling housing prices; widespread
unemployment and underemployment; rapid tightening of credit;
and, as a result of all of those trends, much higher rates of default
and foreclosure. 59 The FHA noted in its second annual report that
the "shortcomings of the old system need no recital. It financed
extensive overselling of houses at inflated values, to borrowers
unable to pay for them. . "..",60 Needless to say, the same could be
said of our most recent housing bust.
The FHA had an explicit mission of providing "a thorough reform
in the home financing structure."61  In fulfilling that mission, it
helped to make a consumer-friendly, single-family mortgage
mainstream during the Great Depression. 62 This type of mortgage
combined a small down payment with a long-term and a fully
amortized payment schedule-and this type is now dominant in the
residential mortgage market.63 The FHA was following the lead of
59 See Green & Wachter, supra note 21, at 94 ('[Djuring the Great Depression in the early
1930s, property values in the United States declined by 50 percent relative to peak
values .... A wave of foreclosures resulted-typically 250,000 per year between 1931 and
1935.").
60 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 28.
6 FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.
62 See McCormack, supra note 55, at 5 ("Virtually all those people who have had anything
to do with the Federal Housing Administration since its inception four years ago agree that
its greatest contribution has been to make the real estate world amortization conscious.
FHA, of course, did not introduce regularized repayments on mortgages. Some savings
banks and building and loan associations had followed such a practice, at least in part, for
years and years. But today the unamortized mortgage on individual residences is the
exception rather than the rule."). It is worth noting that the FHA, like many organizations,
exaggerates its own successes and minimizes its failures. In the context of the 1930s, the
FHA exaggerated how radically it changed the typical contract terms of the mortgage
market. Some scholars seemed to have taken the FHA's word at face value, see, e.g., Green
& Wachter, supra note 21, at 93, while others have looked at different sources, which have
told a more nuanced story about the development of the contract terms that we are familiar
with in today's mortgage market. See infra note 64 (citing instances where academics and
officials have reviewed alternate sources). The leading example of the FHA's minimization
of its failures would be its characterizations of its history of redlining, discussed below. See
infra Part III.B.1-3.
63 Section 203(b) of Title H of the National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat.
1246 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1709(b)), authorized these mortgages for one to four
family homes. These are often colloquially referred to as "FHA Loans" or "FHA single-family"
loans or mortgages even though they may be secured by homes with up to four units. See, e.g.,
BRUCE E. FOYrE & PAMELA HAIRSTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-421, RAISING THE FHA
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the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, the first of the New Deal
initiatives designed to address the crisis in the housing markets. 64
The FHA touted many other benefits for lenders and
homeowners. The FHA believed that lenders also benefited from
its mortgage insurance system because (1) it protected them from
credit risk, the risk that borrowers would not repay their loans; (2)
it made illiquid mortgages very liquid such that they could be sold
or used as collateral; and (3) it standardized due diligence for
mortgages because the FHA itself vetted them before agreeing to
issue insurance. 65 The first benefit is quite dramatic, as credit risk
is historically the most important of all risks that lenders face.
The second benefit of mortgage insurance for lenders was that
it allowed lenders to sell their mortgages to secondary mortgage
market investors.66 To advance this even further, the federal
government created Fannie Mae in 1938 to create a secondary
MORTGAGE LIMIT: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 2 (1998), http://www.cq.com/graphics/crsreports/98-42
11998-11-03.pdf (discussion of the characteristics of a Section 203 loan). See also David
Reiss, Landlords of Last Resort: Should The Government Subsidize The Mortgages of
Privately-Owned, Small Multifamily Buildings?, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 915, 915 n.1 (2009)
(noting that as a result of historical accident, one to four family homes are typically referred to
as "single-family" homes while buildings with five or more units are typically referred to as
"multifamily" buildings). I use this nomenclature here.
64 Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) loans had fifteen year terms with equal
monthly payments, amortization, and 80% LTV. FISHBACK ET AL., supra note 9, at 86
tbl.8.1. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HOuS., supra note 6, at 118 ("FHA patterned its long-
term, direct-reduction loan after the model established by the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation, which required such contracts under its purchase programs. This step led to
widespread acceptance of the fully amortized, fixed-rate, level-payment mortgage that has
become the dominant mortgage instrument."). See also Michael S. Carliner, Development of
Federal Homeownership "Policy," 9 HOUS. POLY DEBATE 299, 306 (1998) ("Many of the
innovations that have often been attributed to the FHA, such as the long-term self-
amortizing loan, had already been in fairly widespread use, but the FHA, along with the
Home Owners Loan Corporation, caused more lenders to use that type of loan."); Peter M.
Carrozzo, A New Deal for the American Mortgage: The Home Owners' Loan Corporation, the
National Housing Act and the Birth of the National Mortgage Market, 17 U. MIAMI BUS. L.
REV. 1, 13-24, 37-40 (2008) (reviewing the roles of HOLC and FHA).
65 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 23.
6 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-96-123, HOMEOWNERSHIP: FHA'S ROLE IN
HELPING PEOPLE OBTAIN HOME MORTGAGES 18 (1996), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/rc
96123.pdf.
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market for FHA mortgages. 67 Fannie Mae spun off Ginnie Mae in
1968 to securitize FHA mortgages while Fannie securitized
mortgages that were not insured by the federal government.68
Ginnie Mae is a wholly-owned government corporation that is
situated within the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). 69  Ginnie Mae insures mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) that are secured by FHA and other government-
insured or guaranteed mortgages like those of the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA). 70 Ginnie Mae MBS are the only mortgage-
backed securities that are explicitly backed by the federal
government's full faith and credit.71
The federal government's guaranty makes Ginnie Mae MBS very
attractive to investors who are willing to pay a premium over
comparable mortgage-backed securities from other issuers.72 This
premium thus reduces the interest rates paid by homeowners on the
mortgages underlying Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed securities. 73
67 Reiss, supra note 9, at 1028-29.
68 Id. at 1029.
69 12 U.S.C. § 1723. "A government corporation is generally a federally chartered entity
created to serve a public function of a predominantly business nature." GOVTr ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-13-682, FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION: ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS FOR
MODIFYING ITS PRODUCTS, MARKET PRESENCE, AND POWERS 3 n.5 (2013).
70 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1723 (codifying Title 11 of the National Housing Act and
enumerating Ginnie Mae statutory authority). See GINNIE MAE, REPORT TO CONGRESS FISCAL
YEAR 2010, at 1-10, http://www.ginniemae.govfReportToCongress/ (discussing Ginnie Mae's
purpose and products). Ginnie Mae MBS can also include mortgages guaranteed or issued by
the Department of Agriculture's Rural Development and HUD's Office of Public and Indian
Housing. See, e.g., USDA, About Rural Development, USDA.Gov, http://www.rurdev.usda.
gov/AboutRD.html (last visited May 29, 2016) (listing Rural Development's goals and
summarizing its loan portfolio). Nearly all FHA and VA mortgages are securitized by Ginnie
Mae. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-97-93, HOMEOWNERSHIP: POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF
REDUCING FHA'S INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR HOME MORTGAGES 2 (1997).
71 GINNIE MAE, REPORT TO CONGRESS FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 2, http://www.ginniemae.gov/
about/ann rep/ReportToCongress07.pdf. Contrast these Ginnie Mae MBS with the securities
of Fannie and Freddie which were long understood to have the implicit backing of the federal
government. See generally Reiss, supra note 1, at 910.
72 See GINNIE MAE, supra note 70, at 3 ('The Ginnie Mae guaranty ... makes Ginnie Mae
securities highly liquid and attractive to domestic and foreign investors of all types."); THOMAS
P. LEMI E ET AL., MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES § 2:4 (2015) (discussing how Ginnie Mae
allows lenders to charge a lower interest rate for loans).
73 GINNIE MAE, supra note 70, at 1.
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The attractiveness of the guaranty to investors also creates an
extraordinarily liquid market for Ginnie Mae securities.7 4 Thus,'
because of the federal government's guaranty, Ginnie Mae can
continue to provide liquidity even when credit is drying up
elsewhere in the credit markets. 75 This benefit has been readily
apparent during the Great Recession.7 6
At the same time that the FHA touted its benefits to lenders, it
also promoted itself as a protector of consumers. For instance, it
heralded standardization as "essential in the first real major
offensive in the history of our people against an impracticable
mortgage lending system unsuited to actual conditions and too
often unsafe for the inexperienced borrower who merits security
and protection in his dealings."77
Homeowners would benefit from a standard mortgage form, one
that would protect "the borrower against ambiguous or 'trick'
clauses... ,"78 The FHA designed its procedures to "prevent
borrowers from attempting to buy beyond their means. In the
past, many persons have lost their savings because they lacked
knowledge of the expenses involved in home ownership; if they had
been better informed they could have succeeded in owning more
modest homes."79 Thus, the FJA was designed from the outset
with consumer protection, along with liquidity, stability and
standardization, as its core values. The FHA's original
74 LEMKE ET AL., supra note 72, § 2:6 ("[Tjhe federal guarantee has made the Ginnie Mae
MBS the most marketable of all the secondary mortgage market instruments.").
75 See GINNIE MAE, supra note 70, at 3-4 (describing the capital flow cycle of these
securities).
76 Id.
77 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 24.
78 Id. at 25; cf. David Reiss, Message in a Mortgage. What Dodd-Frank's "Qualified
Mortgage" Tells Us About Ourselves, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 717, 723-24 (2012)
(discussing QM rule's consumer protection provisions).
79 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 6. See also FED. Hous. ADMIN.,
UNDERWRITING MANUAL para. 318 (1936) ("Ability to Pay is the most heavily weighted
feature in the Rating of Borrower category because, in the final analysis, the satisfactory
payment of the mortgage loan is largely dependent on the borrower's financial ability to
meet the prescribed monthly installments .... It is obvious that default is inevitable if the
borrower's resources will not enable him to comply with all the contractual obligations
created by the mortgage and mortgage notes which he signs.").
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underwriting requirements also mandated that borrowers' ability
to repay be documented notwithstanding the fact that the home
provided sufficient security to ensure that the loan would be
repaid, thereby barring equity-based lending.80
Early on, the FHA took credit for a qualitative change in the
housing market that resulted from its policies and practices: "In
view of the low monthly payments required to amortize a long-
term mortgage, it appears that the single-mortgage system has
brought new homes within reach of many families previously
unable to acquire them."81 While the FHA's assessment of its own
performance is not always merited, it was in this case.8 2
In order to move away from the unsustainable practices that
preceded it, the FHA initially set the maximum term for a
mortgage that it would insure at twenty years and the maximum
LTV ratio at 80%.83 At its creation, the FHA served a broad swath
of the residential mortgage market, given that it could insure
mortgages with principal amounts as high as $16,000 (meaning
that a home could be valued as high as $20,000 with a maximum
LTV of 80%) when the median price for a house in the United
States was a bit more than $5,000.84 Interest rates were capped in
order to equalize rates among local markets and to limit the effects
of restricted capital. 85
80 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 25. Cf. David Reiss, Consumer Protection
Out of the Shadows of Shadow Banking: The Role of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, 7 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 131, 135 n.26 (2012) (discussing Dodd-Frank's
Ability-to-Repay rule).
81 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 21.
82 See supra note 62 (discussing how the FHA often exaggerates its successes while
minimizing its failures).
83 See Jaffee & Quigley, supra note 57, at 105 (noting FHA policies at the time of its
creation).
84 Id. Only 3.4% of homes in 1930 were valued at more than $20,000. FISHBACK ET AL.,
supra note 9, at 37. That proportion surely sank by the time the FHA was authorized in
1934. The VA uses slightly different nomenclature. Instead of calling itself a mortgage
insurer, it calls itself a mortgage guarantor.
85 FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 4 (discussing how the activities of the FHA
were centered around the need for more capital to use in real property). The capped
interest rate changed over time in response to market pressures and was circumvented by
the charging of points at origination to compensate the lender for a below-market capped
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A. MORTGAGE INSURANCE EXPLAINED
Mortgage insurance is typically required for borrowers with
limited funds for down payments.86 Lenders, not borrowers, are
the direct beneficiaries of mortgage insurance.8 7 Depending on the
insurer, mortgage insurance will pay some or all of a lender's loss
upon default or foreclosure of the loan.88 The FJA has long been
the dominant mortgage insurer.8 9 Other significant providers are
the VA90 and private companies, known as private mortgage
insurers (PMIs).9 1
interest rate. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR HouS. MGMT., supra note 34, at 11-13 (noting that
the actual yield on FHA insured mortgages is close to conventional mortgages because of
the added points).
8 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 66, at 16. Substitutes for mortgage insurance do
exist. Portfolio lenders can self-insure against higher losses from loan down payment loans.
Another alternative is for the borrower to take out two mortgages at the time of purchase.
The first mortgage would have an 80% LTV while the second mortgage, known as a
piggyback mortgage, would cover 10% to 20% of the remainder. FED. HOuS. FIN. AGENCY,
STATE OF THE PRIVATE MORTGAGE INSURANCE INDUSTRY: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MORTGAGE
MARKETS AND THE ENTERPRISES 2 (2009) (Mortgage Market Note 09-4).
87 Diana G. Browne, The Private Mortgage Insurance Industry, the Thrift Industry and
the Secondary Mortgage Market: Their Interrelationships, 12 AKRON L. REV. 631, 631 (1979).
88 See id.
89 See id. (explaining that the government provided mortgage insurance through the
FHA after the Great Depression and that PMIs came back on the scene in the late 1950s).
90 Until 1988, the VA was known as the Veterans' Administration. Department of
Veterans Affairs Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-527, § 2, 102 Stat. 2635 (1988).
91 The body of literature about PMI is not large. See GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
13-722, FHA MORTGAGE INSURANCE: APPLICABILITY OF INDUSTRY REQUIREMENTS IS LIMITED,
BUT CERTAIN FEATURES COULD ENHANCE OVERSIGHT 9-11 (2013) (contrasting PMI and FHA
insurance); Quintin Johnstone, Private Mortgage Insurance, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783,
808-31 (2004) (discussing regulation of PMIs); Roger Blood, Mortgage Default Insurance:
Credit Enhancement for Homeownership, 16 HOUS. FIN. INT'L 49, 49-51 (2001) (providing an
overview of mortgage insurance in the U.S.); Kristin Chen, The Role of Mortgage Insurance in
Risk Management, 1 INT'L J. REAL EST. FIN. 8 (2000); Glenn Canner & Wayne Passmore,
Private Mortgage Insurance, 80 FED. RES. BULL. 883, 891-99 (comparing PM providers);
Browne, supra note 87, at 633-39 (describing the history of the PM[ sector); ARTHUR D.
LITTLE, INC., The Arthur D. Little Study of the Private Mortgage Insurance Industry (Nov.
1975); Joseph E. Johnson & George B. Flanigan, Regulation of Private Mortgage Insurance, 27
C.P.C.U. ANNALS 92 (1974); CHESTER RAPKIN ET AL., THE PRIVATE INSURANCE OF HOME
MORTGAGES: A STUDY OF MORTGAGE GUARANTY INSURANCE CORPORATION (1967) (comparing
and contrasting the FHA and Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation in the modern era);
James Graaskamp, Development and Structure of Mortgage Loan Guaranty Insurance in the
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Mortgage insurance works as follows: When a borrower
purchases a home with a small down payment, the lender may
require that she purchase mortgage insurance at the same time to
protect the lender, not the borrower, from a default.92 The lender
may do this to transfer some of the risk of loss to the insurer but
also to make the loan eligible for purchase by Ginnie Mae, Fannie
Mae, or Freddie Mac. 93 These entities can then securitize pools of
mortgages and insure the owners of the securities against late
payments and nonpayments.94 If the borrower does default and
the property is foreclosed upon, the lender can look to the insurer
to make up some or all of the difference between the foreclosure
sale price and the outstanding amount due on the loan (consisting
of unpaid principal and interest as well as all of the other costs
that may be due under the mortgage, such as those relating to the
foreclosure itself).95 By doing this, the lender has offloaded some
or all of the risk of default to the insurer. If there were no
mortgage insurance, that entire credit risk would remain with the
lender or its successor.96
Mortgage insurers charge a premium to the borrower for the
insurance.97 PMIs generally charge a monthly premium. 98 The
VA guarantee fee is an up-front charge, but it can be financed as
part of the mortgage. 99 The FHA charges an up-front premium
United States, 34 J. RISK & INS. 47, 60-67 (1967) (describing the mortgage guaranty process
and related regulation).
92 See Browne, supra note 87, at 635 (describing the function of modern mortgage
insurance companies).
93 Canner & Passmore, supra note 91, at 887.
94 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 66, at 18 (explaining how the entities use
mortgage pools). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have their own statutory requirements
relating-to-loan to value ratios with which they must comply. These requirements may be
waived if there is mortgage insurance in place. See Reiss, supra note 9, at 1032 (referencing
the requirements and their effects).
95 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 66, at 17 ("If a borrower does not repay an
insured mortgage loan as agreed, the lender may acquire the property through foreclosure
and file a claim with the mortgage insurer for all or a portion of its total losses.").
96 Id.
97 Id. at 35.
9 Id.
9 Id. at 36.
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that can be financed as part of the mortgage in addition to an
annual premium. 100 These premiums allow the FHA to be self-
funded; that is, it requires no funds from the federal government
to maintain its operations. 101
Mortgage insurance products from the various insurers differ
from each other as to the
1. maximum mortgage amounts and LTV ratios
allowed;
2. underwriting standards for borrowers, such as
the income-to-expense qualifying ratio
requirement;
3. funds required at loan closing for such items as
down payment and closing costs; and
4. dollar amount or percent of loss that each
organization will pay lenders to cover the losses
associated with foreclosed loans.10 2
The FHA generally insures a lower maximum principal amount
than other insurers. 10 3 FHA insurance stands out from other
forms of mortgage insurance for protecting the lender from nearly
all of the losses from a loan that has gone through foreclosure;
other insurers, both government and private, only insure a portion
of the potential losses.104
The amount insured by the VA has been changed by Congress
over time but has never been as high as that of the FlA.105 PMIs
usually insure a much smaller proportion of the losses, from 20%
100 Id. at 35.
101 Id. at 18. The recent bailout discussed below in Part III.B.9 broke this long string of
self-sufficiency.
102 Id. at 26.
103 See id. at 5.
104 Id. at 36. FHA mortgage insurance has differed from the other types because "it allows
closing costs to be financed in the mortgage" and "provides nearly full insurance coverage to
lenders." Id. at 4.
0r, See id. at 36-37 (illustrating the VA guaranty schedule); id. at 5 (noting the NVA covers
only 25 to 50 percent of the mortgage balance, even if a loss exceeds that amount").
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to 35%.106 While the FHA and the VA insure or guarantee "loans
with effective loan-to-value ratios that exceed 100 percent (due to
the financing of closing costs or other fees)," PMIs typically require
at least a 3% down payment,107 although that requirement has
relaxed during the Subprime Boom of the early 2000s.108
Homeowners choose FHA over PMI mortgages for one or more
of the following reasons:
1. they cannot or prefer not to make the minimum
down payment required by private mortgage
insurers;
2. their credit scores are weak;
3. their employment histories are short or spotty
or they are self-employed; or
4. their total debt-to-income ratios are higher than
what a private mortgage insurer would
accept. 109
Thus, the FHA effectively extends credit to borrowers whom other
lenders reject, at least on the terms desired by the borrowers. The
existence of PMI is explained in large part because of the FHA's
cross-subsidization model by which low-risk borrowers pay the
same premium as high-risk borrowers. 10 A PMI company can
typically offer a better deal to the low-risk borrower and often has
additional competitive advantages, such as easier paperwork and
faster approval times.'11
The FHA does most of its work through the operation of five
insurance funds: Mutual Mortgage Insurance (MMI); General
Insurance (GI); Special Risk Insurance (SRI); Hope for
106 Id. at 36.
107 Id. at 5.
108 See infra Part II.B.8.
109 See FOOTE & HAIRSTON, supra note 63, at 23 (outlining the reasons why homebuyers
may choose FHA loans).
11o See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HOUS., supra note 6, at 162 (noting that PMLs can charge
lower premium rates since they do not cross-subsidize).
M Id.
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Homeowners (H4H); and the Cooperative Management Housing
Insurance Fund (CMHI). 112 The MMI Fund is the FHA's largest
by far. It is used for most of the FHA single-family programs.11 3
The MMI Fund covers $1.173 trillion of insured mortgages.11 4
Indeed, in 2010 alone, the massive MMI Fund amounted to 43% of
all types of loans and guarantees made by the federal
112 FED. Hous. ADMIN., FISCAL YEARS 2013 AND 2012 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AUDIT 27
(2013). Section 203(b) of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. § 1709(b)(2)(A)(i)), authorized
the creation of the single-family mortgage insurance program. Program regulations are in
24 C.F.R. Part 203. The MMI Fund supports the 203(b) program. The fund is called a
"mutual insurance" fund because it was designed to act like other types of mutual insurance
with policyholders sharing in the risk of default as well as a share of any excess monies that
the fund generated. See L.E. Cooper, Prepare To Insure Home Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 1934, at RE1 ('When the amount accumulated in the fund equals the unpaid balances of
the outstanding insured mortgages the excess will be applied for the benefit of the home
owner by paying off the mortgage balances before maturity."); see also FED. HOUS. ADMIN.,
REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 1, MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE: AMENDED ADMINISTRATIVE
RULES AND REGULATIONS UNDER TITLE II OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING ACT 5 (1935) ('The
mortgage insurance system will operate on the mutual principle, which may be described as
follows: The premium for insurance, ultimately payable by the mortgagor, represents a
charge adequately in excess of any amount which might be necessary to cover any possible
losses. Out of the fund built up from such premiums actual losses and costs of
administration will first be paid, and then the remainder of the fund will be redistributed to
the mortgages to apply toward extinguishing the mortgage debt for the benefit of the
mortgagors."). The "mutual" aspect of FHA insurance has diminished over time. See
INTEGRATED FIN. ENG'G, INC., ACTUARIAL REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING
ADMINISTRATION MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND FORWARD LOANS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013, at 2 (2013) ('To further strengthen the capital position of the Fund, the NAHA
[National Affordable Housing Act] legislation linked FHA's ability to pay distributive shares
to the actuarial soundness of the entire MMI Fund (as defined in the legislation), rather
than solely considering the performance of the loans endorsed during a particular year, as
had been done in years prior to 1990. This amendment allowed distributive share
payments only if the Fund achieved the capital standard established by the legislation, and
then at the discretion of the Secretary of HUD. No distributive shares have been paid since
the passage of NAHA.").
113 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ASSESSING THE GOVERNMENT'S COSTS FOR MORTGAGE
INSURANCE PROVIDED BY THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION 1 (2006), http://www.cbo.
gov/ftpdocs/74xx/doc7412/07-17-FHA.pdf.
"4 INTEGRATED FIN. ENG'G, INC., supra note 112, at 68. In 2006, the MMI Fund was "the
federal government's largest mortgage insurance program." CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra
note 113, at 1.
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government."15 The MMI's programs are "unique among federal
direct loan and guarantee programs as they are required to be self-
supporting."' 6 In contrast, the VA mortgage guaranty program is
subsidized by the federal government. 17
At the outset, the MMI Fund was operated very
conservatively.1 8 But the FHA changed in many ways over its
eighty-year history, as will be seen in the following section. It
faced competitive pressures from a resurgent private mortgage
insurance industry. It responded to great social and economic
upheavals and shed some of those responses as times changed.
And most importantly for this Article, it loosened its underwriting
to achieve various social goals to good and ill effect.
B. A HISTORY OF THE FHA'S CHANGING MISSIONS
Congress added and discontinued various missions of the FHA
since its creation during the Great Depression. Depending on the
political winds, it targeted different types of buyers and different
types of residences at different times. Some programs were very
successful, and some were abject failures. These initiatives, and
other important FHA developments, are reviewed below.
1. The 1930s: Creation and Execution. Compared to
contemporary housing finance reforms, the FHA was set up fast,
efficiently, and with a broad base of support throughout the
country, the very model of a New Deal program.
The FHA was meant to replace the private mortgage insurance
industry that predated it. The first mortgage insurance company
was incorporated in 1887, with a few more incorporating through
115 DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE
FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE FHA MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND FISCAL YEAR 2010, at
1 (2010), http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/rmra/oe/rpts/actr/2010actr-subltr.pdf.
116 Id. As noted above, the federal government had to provide a cash infusion to the FHA
for the first time in its history in 2013. See FED. HOUS. ADMIN., supra note 24, at ii
(describing how the FHA required a $1.68 billion appropriation from the Treasury in 2013).
117 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 66, at 18.
118 The FHA's second annual report states that the "sound operation of the mutual
mortgage insurance system requires that only sound mortgages be accepted for insurance."
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 25.
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the early 1900s.119 The industry first took off after New York
legalized it in 1904120 and then boomed during World War J.121
There were twelve companies in New York in 1921 and at least
fifty by 1930.122 For many years, the industry had "practically no
losses ' 123 until it was wiped out in the early 1930s.124 Its
119 GEORGE W. ALGER, REPORT TO HIS EXCELLENCY HERBERT H. LEHMAN, GOVERNOR OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK, BY GEORGE W. ALGER, APPOINTED UNDER THE EXECUTIVE LAW TO
EXAMINE AND INVESTIGATE THE MANAGEMENT AND AFFAIRS OF THE INSURANCE
DEPARTMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE OPERATION, CONDUCT, AND MANAGEMENT OF TITLE AND
MORTGAGE GUARANTEE CORPORATIONS UNDER ITS SUPERVISION 8 (1934). According to one
source, "a poorly worded stretch of the New York State 1885 Statutes in regard to title
insurance was misinterpreted to permit the guaranty of mortgages against loss for reasons
other than title defect." James Graaskamp, Development and Structure of Mortgage Loan
Guaranty Insurance in the United States, 34 J. RISK & INS. 47, 49 (1967).
120 See In re Ryan's Will, 52 N.E.2d 909, 921 (N.Y. 1943) ("[Tlhe legislature by laws of
1904, chapter 543, amending Insurance Law, § 170, had authorized title guaranty
insurance companies to 'guarantee or insure the payment of bonds and mortgages.' "). The
early PMI industry shared characteristics with modern title insurers, mortgage bankers
and bond insurers. See ALGER, supra note 119, at 93. Thirteen other states had statutes
governing mortgage insurance in 1933. Id. at 141.
121 ALGER, supra note 119, at 8.
122 FISHBACK ET AL., supra note 9, at 16. Those fifty companies had written insurance on an
amount "equal to one-tenth of all outstanding residential mortgage debt .. " Id. The New
York Banking Department also licensed mortgage insurers, and those companies are not
included in the fifty companies mentioned above. PROMONTORY FIN. GRP., LLC, THE ROLE OF
PRIVATE MORTGAGE INSURANCE IN THE U.S. HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM 32 n.53 (2011), http://
usmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/622-Genworth-Study-I-Role-of-PMI.pdf. This report was
prepared at request of Genworth Financial, a private mortgage insurer.
123 ALGER, supra note 119, at 12.
124 Eugene N. White, Lessons from the Great American Real Estate Boom and Bust of the
1920s, 30, 32 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15573, 2009), http:/www.
nber.org/papers/w15573.pdf. In the 1920s,
the real estate aspects of the mortgage guaranty conformed to the general
practice of inept appraisal, high leverage, and, in at least one case, over-
certification of a mortgage portfolio. However, integrity of management did
not actually break down until 1932 and 1933, when desperate executives
found hope of continued liquidity in reselling at par, for cash, their own
securities to the uninformed small investor, securities purchased in the
money markets at great discount.
Graaskamp, supra note 119, at 51. In New York, the home to the most private mortgage
insurers, eighteen companies were taken over by the New York Insurance Department.
ALGER, supra note 119, at 2. The companies taken over had well over two thirds of the
mortgage guarantee market in New York. See MORELAND COMM'N, MEMORANDUM
RESPECTING THE PLAN FOR THE RELIEF AND PROTECTION OF HOLDERS OF GUARANTEED
MORTGAGE CERTIFICATES 1 (undated) (appended to ALGER, supra note 119).
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companies began to fail as almost half of all of the mortgages in
the nation defaulted. 125 New York State banned PMI in 1938 in
response to this track record, 126 and the PMI industry did not
return until the 1950s.12 7
The FHA's Mutual Mortgage Insurance (MM1) Fund was the
federal government's main alternative to PMI. It was initially
"designed to make generally available, to owners of homes,
mortgage loans that embrace the following features":
1. Long term credit, not exceeding 20 years;
2. Complete amortization which provides for (a)
steady reduction of principal, (b) no renewals,
and consequently no renewal charges, and (c)
ultimate debt-free home ownership;
3. A single first mortgage for a higher percentage
of the value than has been customary, but not
exceeding 80 percent of the appraised value;
4. Low interest rate.128
The FHA Administrator noted after its first full year of operation
that in "most districts of the country, mortgage money frozen
almost solid a year ago, is now generally available to home owners
on the most attractive terms in the history of the Nation."'129
125 Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 21, at 358.
126 PROMONTORY FIN. GRP., LLC, supra note 122, at 31.
127 DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 7, at 154.
128 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 17. For a limited time, Congress
authorized the FHA to insure certain mortgages with twenty-five year terms with loan-to-
value ratios as high as 90%. National Housing Act Amendments of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-
424, 52 Stat. 8, 10-11 (1938) (amending section 203(b) of the National Housing Act of 1938).
Only mortgages secured by newly constructed, owner-occupied homes with (i) a principal
amount of less than $5,400 where the owner had paid a 10% down payment or (ii) a
principal amount of less than $8,600 where the owner had paid a down payment of between
10% and 20% were eligible for this particular type of mortgage insurance. Id. The FHA
clearly laid out the elements of the original program in a consumer guide, HOW TO HAVE
THE HOME YOU WANT (1936).
129 SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at vii.
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The next year, the FHA Administrator ascribed the following
developments in the residential mortgage market to the
introduction of the MMI Fund:
The firm establishment of the long-term monthly
amortized mortgage in the home mortgage lending
practice of the Nation.
The free flow of mortgage money from centers of
supply into communities where funds are normally
scarce.
The reduction in mortgage financing charges for
large sections of the country, due to the uniform
interest rate established by the [FHA].
Improvement in construction practices, influenced by
standardized appraisal methods, based on minimum
property standards.
Increased safety to both the home buyer and the
mortgage lender throughout the life of the mortgage as
a result of insurance protection and the safeguards
attending it. 130
In sum, the FHA helped American housing markets to rise from
their bottom by providing more easily accessible credit on terms
that were more attractive than those offered by the private sector.
The FHA largely replaced the private mortgage insurance
companies that had failed in the early 1930s, but it went far
beyond their role in many, many ways. 131
As told by Kenneth Jackson in his classic book Crabgrass
Frontier, the FHA had a major negative impact on central cities
and minority communities from its very beginning. 132 Its impact
130 Id. at vi.
131 Green & Wachter, supra note 21, at 95.
132 JACKSON, supra note 26, at 203-18. See Robert C. Weaver, Housing Discrimination:
An Overview, in A SHELTERED CRISIS: THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING IN THE EIGHTIES 1, 3,
Keynote Address at a consultation sponsored by the United States Commission on Civil
Rights (Sept. 26-27, 1983) ("Exclusion of blacks from suburbia inflicted a high level of
discrimination upon them."); ROBERT C. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO 70 (1948) ("Not only
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on the former was unintentional. Because the FHA made
financing available for so much new housing, white working-class
families fled the cities to the newly built suburbs in massive
numbers. 133
But the impact on minority households was quite intentional:
the FHA reflected the widely-held prejudices and discriminatory
practices already endemic in the all-white housing and mortgage-
lending industries. 134 One of the main such practices was the
imposition of restrictive covenants that excluded blacks and other
minorities. 135 The FHA also drew red lines on its underwriting
maps to cordon off blocks in which even a single non-white family
were the vast majority of Negroes financially unable to participate in the FHA program, but
even those who could afford to build new homes were stymied by their relegation to the
Black Belt."). The FHA was not the only or first federal agency to have such an impact. See
Amy E. Hillier, Redlining and the Homeowners' Loan Corporation, 29 J. URB. HIST. 394,
412-15 (2003) (arguing that HOLC played a role in institutionalized redlining and industry
practices); ERNEST FISHER & HOMER HOYT, FED. HOUS. ADMIN., THE STRUCTURE AND
GROWTH OF RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS IN AMERICAN CITIES 28 (1939) (noting, in this
FHA report, that the federal government began tracking the "[plercentage of the total
number of persons living in the block that are of a race other than white" in 1934 as part of
the real property surveys conducted by the Works Progress Administration).
'33 JACKSON, supra note 26, at 211-17.
134 See RICHARD R.W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 109 (2013) (stating that the FHA's
"Underwriting Manual reflected private developers' and brokers' views of the kinds of
features that made housing values stable and secure. Those features clearly included racial
segregation."). See generally Amanda Tillotson, Race, Risk and Real Estate: The Federal
Housing Administration and Black Homeownership in the Post World War II Home
Ownership State, 8 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 25 (2014) (arguing that the FHA was not the first
to implement discriminatory practices like restrictive covenants).
'35 See FED. HouS. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL para. 980(3)g (1938) (stating that
restrictive covenants should prohibit "the occupancy of properties except by the race for which
they are intended"); Charles M. Lamb & Adam W. Nye, Do Presidents Control Bureaucracy?
The Federal Housing Administration during the Truman-Eisenhower Era, 127 POL. SCI. Q.
445 (2012) (documenting similar history); see also FED. HOUS. ADMIN., supra note 79, para. 233
(stating that areas surrounding the home should be investigated "to determine whether or not
incompatible racial and social groups are present, to the end that an intelligent prediction may
be made regarding the possibility or probability of the location being invaded by such groups.
If a neighborhood is to retain stability it is necessary that properties shall continue to be
occupied by the same social and racial classes. A change in social or racial occupancy
generally leads to instability and a reduction in values.').
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lived. 136 Such "redlined" blocks were not eligible for FHA-insured
mortgages. 13 7 The end result of such redlining was a massive
disinvestment in cities with large black populations. 138 Older
cities of the Northeast, like Camden, N.J., were particularly hard
hit.139 The link between bureaucratic redlining and the decline of
cities was not fully made until the 1960s at which point many of
the affected cities had become shadows of their former selves. 140
One contemporaneous estimate found that FHA insured 16% of
all new single-family non-farm residences in 1935 and 23% in
1936.141 By 1937, the FHA "participated in 45% of all housing
starts in the United States. From 1935 to 1939, FHA-insured
loans accounted for 23% of all single-family mortgage lending,
including refinance loans."'142 Conservative underwriting meant
that in 1940, lenders had foreclosed on less than four-tenths of 1%
of those FHA-insured mortgages originated in the 1930s. 143 The
FHA's first few years seemed to be an unvarnished success as a
government response to the liquidity crisis in the mortgage market
brought about by the Great Depression. By 1939, the FHA was
136 JACKSON, supra note 26, at 208-09. An official 1939 FIA report states that in "wholly
white areas, the gradual filtration of other than white races tends slowly to change the
character of neighborhoods. The presence of even one nonwhite person in a block otherwise
populated by whites may initiate a period of transition." FISHER & HOYT, supra note 132, at
54.
137 JACKSON, supra note 26, at 209, 213.
138 Id. at 210-14.
139 Id. at 213.
140 Id. at 214-15. John Kimble, and others, have argued that African Americans were
intentionally contained in older urban areas by the FHA. John Kimble, Insuring Inequality:
The Role of the Federal Housing Administration in the Urban Ghettoization of African
Americans, 32 L. & SOC. INQ. 399, 407-13 (2007). Whether it was intentional or not, the
FHA's policies certainly had that effect.
141 Weimer, supra note 13, at 477.
142 Dan Immergluck, From Minor to Major Player: The Geography of FHA Lending During
the U.S. Mortgage Crisis, 33 J. URB. AFF. 1, 4 (2011).
143 FED. Hous. ADMIN., SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING
ADMINISTRATION, LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL (1941), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.
39015005860161.
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financially self-sustaining, with its insurance premiums and other
fees covering its operating expenses. 1"
2. The 1940s: War Housing. The FRA, as with the rest of the
nation, transitioned from responding to the Great Depression to
responding to the exigencies imposed by World War II. For the
FHA, this meant helping to house defense industry workers and
their families. 145 At the same time, the FHA sought to "encourage
production of new homes for families in income classifications
which were not considered as feasible markets for new homes
under the previous systems of home financing."14 6 FHIA market
share increased to 45% by 1944.147 As World War II ended, the
FHA turned its attention from war mobilization to the needs of
returning veterans and their families.148 One effect of this shift in
attention was that FHA borrowers skewed younger as a result. 149
144 MILES L. COLEAN, AMERICAN HOUSING: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 267 (1944).
Previously, the FHA's operating expenses had been paid by the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation. Losses Are Small on FHA Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1938, at 1. The FHA
was initially capitalized with an initial fund of $10 million to cover its losses. COLEAN, supra.
145 FED. Hous. ADMIN., EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION
3 (1942), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015005860161; see also Gain in Home
Building Attributed Largely to Defense Area Growth, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1942, at 63 ("In the
past 17 months, a major portion of the American residential construction industry has been
devoted to the production of new housing to meet the acute need for additional living
accommodations in defense production centers where employment has been increasing
rapidly."). This housing was referred to as Section 603 housing, built pursuant to the War
Housing Program. See ERNEST M. FISHER, URBAN REAL ESTATE MARKETS: CHARACTERISTICS
AND FINANCING 80 tbl.23 (1951) (listing the distribution of FHA-insured mortgages on new
and existing single-family homes from 1935 to 1948). In 1945, for instance, the bulk of new
homes were financed by Section 603. Id.
146 FED. Hous. ADMIN., SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING
ADMINISTRATION 17 (1941), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015005860161.
147 Immergluck, supra note 142, at 6.
148 FED. HOUS. ADMIN., THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING
ADMINISTRATION 6 (1946), http:/Ibabel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?seq--87&id=mdp.39015082064752
&page=root&view--image&size=100&orientO; see FHA Plans Drive for Construction of
Several Hundred Thousand Homes on $6,000 Insured Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1948, at
4 (discussing the FHA's plan to build lower-cost housing to meet demand).
149 FED. HOuS. ADMIN., FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING
ADMINISTRATION 77 (1947), http:/Ibabel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?seq=349;id=mdp.39015082064
752;page--root;view=lup;size=1O0;orient-O; 17;num=l 17.
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The VA mortgage-guarantee program was created in 1944 as
part of the "GI Bill."'150 The VA did not require down payments "on
the theory that soldiers weren't paid enough to accumulate
savings."'' 1  The VA market share peaked in 1947 at almost
28%,152 and this peak was matched by a decline in the FRA
market share.153
In 1948, the FHA made an important change that is now
integral to our notion of the American mortgage: it increased the
maximum term for an FHA mortgage to thirty years. 154
Extraordinarily, nearly one-third of "new nonfarm residential
construction (including rental housing as well as small homes)"
received financing through the FHA's war housing insurance
program by 1948.155 Continuing with one of its original mandates
to protect the housing consumer, the FHA sought to improve the
quality of construction: "The revised FHA regulations contemplate
the construction of a basic house, sound and livable, stripped of
nonessential features but embodying complete living facilities and
conforming to local standards for comparable dwellings."'156
Prior to 1948, explicit restrictions based on race, ethnicity, and
religion were common among private property owners. Even more,
the federal government actively encouraged such restrictions
through a variety of methods, including underwriting decisions of
the FHA.157  The Supreme Court rejected this form of
50 The GI Bill is formally known as the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L.
No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284m. The mortgage guarantee program is found in Title III of the Act.
151 Carliner, supra note 64, at 308. The VA's no-down-payment requirement changed at
times. See HOME MORTGAGE DELINQUENCY AND FORECLOSURE 7-11 (John P. Herzog &
James S. Earley eds., 1970) (describing such changes for new and existing homes between
1946 and 1967).
152 Jaffee & Quigley, supra note 57, at 106.
153 Immergluck, supra note 142, at 6.
154 Green & Wachter, supra note 21, at 96.
155 FED. HOUS. ADMIN., supra note 149, at 11.
156 Id. at 14. See also COLEAN, supra note 28, at 22-23 ("Through the construction
requirements and housing standards of the Federal Housing Administration, the government
has imposed a sort of super-code in so far as the operations of that agency are concerned.").
157 See, e.g., FED. HOUS. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL para. 980(3)g (1938)
("Recommended restrictions should include provision for the following: ... Probation of the
occupancy of properties except by the race for which they are intended.').
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discrimination in the landmark case of Shelley v. Kraemer.158 Soon
after Shelley, the FRA amended its rules to bar insurance for
homes for which covenants "restricting the use or occupancy of the
property on the basis of race, creed, or color" were to be recorded
prior to the recordation of the FRA-insured mortgage. 15 9 But
notwithstanding this clear statement of the law, the FHA
continued to informally support the use of racially restrictive
covenants for years after Shelley was decided. 160 This support was
true even though the Truman Administration revised the FHA's
Underwriting Manual in 1949 to include equal opportunity
standards as very little actually changed in practice. 161
1 334 U.S. 1, 20--21 (1948).
159 FED. Hous. ADMIN., SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING
ADMINISTRATION 3 (1949), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?seq=647;id=mdp.39015082064752
;page=root;view-lup;size=100;orient=O;num=ll (stating that the ban applied to covenants
recorded after February 15, 1950).
160 Lamb & Nye, supra note 135, at 449. See also David M.P. Freund, Marketing the Free
Market: State Intervention and the Politics of Prosperity in Metropolitan America, in THE
NEW SUBURBAN HISTORY 11, 31 (Kevin M. Kruse & Thomas J. Sugrue eds., 2006) (noting
that Eisenhower's nominee to run the Housing and Home Finance Agency, which included
the FHA, "announced during his 1953 confirmation hearing that he would not stop local
authorities from maintaining racial segregation in federally funded programs"); COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDERSTANDING FAIR HOUSING 5 (1973) (noting that eighteen months after
Shelley was decided, the "new FHA policy of refusing to insure mortgages on properties
carrying a racial covenant applied only to covenants filed after February 1950. This left the
accumulation of the first 15 years of FHA-insured mortgages protected by the covenants on
thousands of homes untouched.").
161 See FED. HOUS. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL para. 242 (1955) (including 1949
revisions which states "jU]nderwriting considerations shall recognize the right to equality
of opportunity to receive the benefits of the mortgage insurance system in obtaining
adequate housing accommodations irrespective of race, color, creed or national origin.").
Despite these revisions, most FHA staff turned a blind eye to these equality of opportunity
provisions. See WENDELL E. PRITCHETT, ROBERT CLIFTON WEAVER AND THE AMERICAN
CITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AN URBAN REFORMER 155 (2008) ("The Shelley decision in
particular created intense concern for many builders, realtors, and their supporters in the
government. In response, federal housing administrator Raymond Foley asked for a review
of agency policies to see if they would have to be changed in light of the decision. The
conclusion of his staff was that the agency could continue business as usual. They would no
longer recommend restrictive covenants (a change Truman had ordered a year before), but
they would do nothing to prevent them or other forms of discrimination. According to FHA
commissioner Franklin Richards, it was not the place of the government 'to require private
individuals to give up their right to dispose of their property as they see fit.'" (citing
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The FHA continued in its role as a mainstay in the single-
family housing market. The FHA had more than a third of the
mortgage market at the beginning of the 1950s, and the VA had an
additional 13%.162 Its underwriting remained conservative:
foreclosures in process for FHA's primary one-to-four family
program (the Section 203 program) in 1950 were 0.04% of
mortgages in force. 163
3. The 1950s: The Maturation of the American Mortgage. Like
an episode of Mad Men, 16 4 the FHA offered a glittery, new world to
whites and a gritty and impoverished one to blacks. The quality of
housing for white households improved dramatically in the
1950s. 16 5 Black households, however, continued to suffer from a
variety of discriminatory policies, including redlining by the
FHA.166
FIA mortgages in the 1950s began to look very much like FHA
mortgages that would later be offered in the 2000s. For instance,
in 1950, Congress allowed some loans to have lower down
Memorandum from Franklin Richards, Comm'r, Fed. Hous. Admin., to Raymond Foley,
Adm'r, Hous. Home Fin. Admin. (May 21, 1948))).
162 Immergluck, supra note 142, at 6 (noting that FHA had 35% market share in 1950).
See J.E. MORTON, URBAN MORTGAGE LENDING: COMPARATIVE MARKETS AND EXPERIENCE
25, tbl.6 (1956) (providing total FHA/VA market share from 1935-1953).
163 DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 1968 HUD STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 117 (1968), https://
babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=ucl.32106016148535;view=lup;seq=7.
164 Mad Men (AMC Television Broadcast, July 19, 2007 to May 17, 2015).
165 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HOUS., supra note 6, at xix.
'6 Id. Even the positive steps taken by the FHA appeared to be a drop in the bucket.
Kimble, supra note 140, at 428-29 ("In 1947, following the creation of the Minority Group
Housing Program, the agency did increase its acceptance of minority housing projects,
insuring 205 new developments for minority occupancy between 1947 and 1954 with an
additional 146 small projects in the process of being completed. Yet in aggregate this
amounted to a total of only 29,386 dwelling units, 15 percent of which were open to white
occupants as well. To provide some perspective on the proportion of this effort relative to
the FRA's broader operations, by 1953 the FHA had provided $33 billion of insurance on
nearly 3,500,000 homes and 650,000 rental and cooperative units, the vast majority of
which were new dwellings outside of central cities."). Between 1934 and 1960, just 2% of
FHA mortgages were made to African Americans. Weaver, supra note 132, at 3.
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payments than previously authorized, as little as 5%.167 In 1957,
the minimum down payment was lowered to 3% in some cases. 168
The 1950s also brought another significant change to the
housing sector. States, with the memory of the failures of the
Great Depression growing dim, began passing laws to allow
private mortgage insurance companies to form. 169 In 1957, the
private mortgage insurer, Mortgage Guaranty Insurance
Corporation, became the first to operate since the Great
Depression.170 Such private mortgage insurance allowed
borrowers to make just 5% or 10% down payments, and the
insurer covered a lender's first 20% to 25% of any potential loss on
an insured loan.17 1 However, this private alternative remained a
small competitor to the FIIA until the 1980s.
The FHA began to loosen underwriting requirements in the
middle of the 1950s, and defaults increased as well. 172 This
loosening was reflected in part by the amendment to the Housing
Act of 1954 which replaced "economic soundness" as the guideline
for the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund to "acceptable risk."'173
167 Housing Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-475, § 104(a), 64 Stat. 48, 51-52 (amended 1950).
This amendment also allowed for larger loans for three and four family homes. Id.
168 Housing Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-104, § 101, 71 Stat. 294, 295 (amending section
203(b) of the National Housing Act of 1934) (also setting higher maximum loan amounts for
three and four family homes).
169 Dwight Jaffee, Monoline Restrictions, with Applications to Mortgage Insurance and
Title Insurance, 28 REV. INDUS. ORG. 83, 85 (2006). Wisconsin passed the first such law in
1956, and California followed suit in 1961. Id. By 1973, every state passed legislation
authorizing PMI. FED. HOuS. FIN. AGENCY, MORT. MKT. NOTE 09-4, STATE OF THE PRIVATE
MORTGAGE INSURANCE INDUSTRY: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MORTGAGE MARKETS AND THE
ENTERPRISES 2 (2009).
170 FOOTE & HAIRSTON, supra note 63, at 3.
171 Id.
172 M. MCFARLAND CARTER, FHA EXPERIENCE WITH MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES AND
PROPERTY ACQUISITIONS 4 (1963). M. McFarland Carter was Assistant Commissioner of
FHA at the time of this report.
173 See FED. HOUS. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL para. 101 (1936) (noting that the
National Housing Act provided "that no mortgage shall be accepted for insurance unless it
is economically sound"). The Housing Act of 1954 introduced the concept of "acceptable
risk." Pub. L. No. 83-560, 68 Stat. 590 § 110 (amending section 203 of the National
Housing Act such that if the FHA Commissioner "finds that the project with respect to
which the mortgage is executed is an acceptable risk, giving consideration to the need for
providing adequate housing for families of low and moderate income particularly in
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This amendment was a harbinger of even looser underwriting
standards to come. 174 These looser standards would have an
outsized impact on the housing stock in older cities. 175
The FHA's performance reflected the changes in its
underwriting policies. Default rates for the primary single-family
insurance program, Section 203, were 0.83% of the mortgages in
force in 1960. Foreclosure rates for the Section 203 program by
1960 were 0.23% of mortgages in force, roughly triple the previous
decade. 176 Change was afoot.
4. The 1960s: Housing in the Urban Core. Over its first thirty
years of operation, the FHA helped to finance about a fifth of all
newly constructed housing, most of it in the suburbs. 177 However,
as of 1967, only 3% of all new homes were sold to African
Americans. 178 But as with the rest of the nation, the ferment over
segregation, civil rights, and economic inequality were the major
historical themes of the 1960s for the FHA. Each of these themes
were clearly reflected in the FHA and its role in the housing
markets, for both good and ill. 179
Beginning in the 1950s and continuing through the 1960s,
Congress added a number of innovative insurance programs to the
FHA's stable.180 They included insurance programs for urban
suburban and outlying areas or small communities," the Commissioner may insure
mortgages that otherwise comply with the FHA requirements). The "economic soundness"
standard had already been weakened somewhat by the provisions of the Housing Act of
1948. COLEAN, supra note 28, at 123-26.
174 See Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 21, at 360.
175 Id. at 359 (describing the change to the "acceptable risk" standard).
176 DEPT OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., 1977 HUD STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 95 tbl.19 (1977),
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.32106016648039;num=121;seq=121;view=1up.
177 RAPKIN ET AL., supra note 91, at 28.
178 PRITCHETT, supra note 161, at 312.
179 See COMM'N ON CIv. RIGHTS, HOUSING 79 (1961) (FHA and VA did not have "effective
policy to insure that the fruits of these benefits (an increased housing supply) reach home
buyers on an equal opportunity basis").
180 And as early as 1961, the federal government began to loosen underwriting standards.
Milton P. Semer et al., Evolution of Federal Legislative Policy in Housing: Housing Credits, in
FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS: PAST AND PRESENT 69, 96 (J. Paul Mitchell ed.,
1985) ("[I]mportant relaxation in FHA mortgage terms was made by the Housing Act of 1961
as one of the efforts of the Kennedy Administration to fight the recession beginning in 1960.").
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renewal; new forms of homeownership like condominiums and
cooperatives; and housing for seniors and the disabled.181 In 1962,
President Kennedy reversed the FHA's redlining policy that had
been in effect since its inception, and the FHA began to embark on
a change of focus to supporting low- and moderate-income
homeownership as well as minority homeownership.18 2 In 1965,
the FHA became a part of the HUD Office of Housing.
Notwithstanding the addition of these new programs, FHA
market share declined in the 1960s.183 By 1964, PMI provider
Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation had eleven
competitors. 184 As PMI was growing, the FHA was also
acknowledging significant operating difficulties, such as delays in
processing applications. 185
In response to the civil unrest of the mid-1960s, President
Johnson appointed the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders, popularly known as the Kerner Commission. The
Kerner Commission found that residential segregation and
unequal housing opportunities were a major cause of civil unrest
in cities.18 6 In particular, it found that
Federal programs have been able to do comparatively
little to provide housing for the disadvantaged. In the
31-year history of subsidized Federal housing, only
181 See Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 21, at 359 (discussing the FHA's targeted
programs designed to combat urban blight).
182 Carliner, supra note 64, at 307. This reversal also applied to the VA. Id. "Part of the
interest in proposals to subsidize low-income homeownership was stimulated by the wave of
urban riots that began in 1963." Id. at 311. See also FHA Will Not Do Business with
Anyone Violating Pennsylvania Anti-Bias Law, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1962, at 6 (describing
Pennsylvania's anti-discrimination housing law and the FHA's response to it). The order
"applied only to FRA and VA housing insured or guaranteed after the date of the order's
issuance (November 20, 1962). It left hundreds of thousands of existing housing units
receiving FHA and VA assistance immune from the requirement of the nondiscrimination
mandate." COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDERSTANDING FAIR HOUSING 6 (1973).
183 Immergluck, supra note 142, at 6.
184 PROMONTORY FIN. GRP., LLC, supra note 122, at 35.
185 CARTER, supra note 172, at 2.
186 See generally REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
(1968).
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about 800,000 units have been constructed, with
recent production averaging about 50,000 units a year.
By comparison, over a period only 3 years longer, FHA
insurance guarantees have made possible the
construction of over 10 million middle and upper
income units. 187
In response to this historical inequity, Congress ensured that
many of the FHA's new programs had a very different
underwriting model than the traditional one.188 These newer
programs typically targeted "underserved borrowers" such as
households of color and were subsidized by the federal
government. 189 The FHA's core single-family Section 203(b)
program, in contrast, had low-risk homeowners cross-subsidize
high-risk homeowners. 90
One such initiative that Congress enacted in 1968, the Section
235 homeownership program, was seen as giving the FHA "an
opportunity to overcome its image as an anti-poor, anti-minority
Government agency."191  The program was also seen as having
great potential by a wide variety of groups, including those
"representing business as well as social welfare concerns."1 92 This
move away from conservative underwriting led to rapidly
187 Id. at 13.
188 In addition to new underwriting models, the FHA also attempted to promote
innovative housing design, for instance by promoting mini-houses on mini-lots. ELSIE
EAVES, NAT'L COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, RESEARCH REPORT No. 16, How THE MANY
COSTS OF HOUSING FIT TOGETHER 36 (1969).
189 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HOUS., supra note 6, at 163-64 (describing the new FHA
initiatives).
190 Cross-subsidies allow the FHA to use premiums from low-risk borrowers to subsidize
the cost of default associated with higher risk borrowers. Id. at 162.
191 COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HOME OWNERSHIP FOR LOWER INCOME FAMILIES A REPORT
ON THE RACIAL AND ETHNIC IMPACT OF THE SECTION 235 PROGRAM 77 (1971). The Section
235 program was enacted as part of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 § 101.
Another initiative was the Section 223(e) program, which "increased the availability of
mortgages for minority and low-income buyers in urban areas." BERYL SATTER, FAMILY
PROPERTIES: RACE, REAL ESTATE, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF BLACK URBAN AMERICA 332
(2009).
192 COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 191, at 7.
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increasing foreclosure rates and ultimately wreaked much havoc
in the early 1970s. 193 This havoc is embodied in the poorly
executed Section 235 program, described below. 194
Defaults and foreclosures rose again during the 1960s. Total
defaults for Section 203 in 1970 were 1.69% of mortgages in
force. 195 Foreclosures in process for Section 203 in 1970 were
0.52% of mortgages in force, more than doubling the rate of the
previous decade. 9 6 These were significant increases from 1950.197
5. The 1970s: Spectacular Failure. By the early 1970s, the
dreams of the 60's were replaced with the hangovers induced by
war, inflation, recession, and continuous civil-rights struggles. By
this time, the FHA "acquired a deserved reputation for confining
its service mostly to white, middle class, suburban home
buyers. '198  Notwithstanding this failing, the American
homeownership rate increased from roughly 44% in 1940 to about
63% in 1970, and the FHA was partially responsible for this
193 HOME MORTGAGE DELINQUENCY AND FORECLOSURE, supra note 151, at 25 tbl.9. VA
mortgages also saw a significant increase in foreclosures, but it was not nearly as large as
that for FHA mortgages. Id. Contemporaneous studies such as MCFARLAND, supra note
172, proposed various hypotheses for this increase, but none were considered particularly
strong. The latter report does, however, acknowledge a move away from conservative
underwriting and towards policies unconnected from sustainable mortgage lending.
MCFARLAND, supra note 172, at 1. These policies included the goals of Congress,
homebuyers, and the home construction industry. Id. See also FHA Finds Easier Terms
Have Increased Defaults on Home Mortgages It Insures, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1961, at 3
('The F.H.A. Chief emphasized, however, that in his view the rise in defaults 'is not at all
alarming.' He added: 'The terms under our programs have been liberalized and this is
being reflected in the rise in insurance claims. But this liberalization, as it helps our
economy and the American people to be better housed, is a wholesome development for the
country and for the F.H.A. program.' ').
94 See infra Part III.B.5. See also VAN ORDER & YEZER, supra note 36, at 7 (discussing
the creation of Section 285); Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
448, § 101, 82 Stat. 476, 477 (1968) (creating Section 235 program). See generally John
McClaughry, The Troubled Dream: The Life and Times of Section 235 of the National
Housing Act, 6 LOY. L.J. 1 (1975) (discussing the history of the 1968 HIJD Act and the
problems HUD and FHA experienced).
195 DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 1979 HUD STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 113 tbl.21 (1979),
http:/Ibabel.hathitrust.org/yr/pt?.id=uc1.32106006213851;seq=133;view=-up;num=113.
1% DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 176, at 95 tbl. 19.
197 Id.
'9 COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 191, at 77.
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increase. 199 The FHA's mortgage origination share (by dollar
volume) reached a new high in 1970, at about a quarter of the
market.200 This share accounted for nearly 30% of all single-family
loans. 20 1 This large share was due to a variety of factors including
the acceleration of the new Section 235 program with its
subsidized interest rates, at the same time that unsubsidized
interest rates were reaching new highs. 202 In its first four years,
the Section 235 program helped to finance homes for about
400,000 low- and moderate-income families.20 3 Section 235 home
buyers had to make only tiny down payments.20 4
In 1973, the Section 235 program was suspended because so
many of its mortgages ended up in default and foreclosure. The
program was terminated a few years later.20 5 Moreover, many of
the homes sold through the program were sold by predators who
covered up structural problems with sheetrock and paint and sold
them to unsophisticated low- and moderate-income buyers. Once
the structural problems surfaced, many of these households could
not afford to repair them, and the homes went into default.20 6
Entire blocks in some cities were lined with boarded-up homes
that had been financed pursuant to Section 235.207
Section 235 represented a low point for the FHA with more
than 200 people convicted for abuses arising from the program. 208
19 See LAWRENCE L. THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF HUD 3 (2006).
200 See Jaffee & Quigley, supra note 57, at 106 (noting that the share peaked in 1970).
201 Immergluck, supra note 142, at 6.
202 FOOTE & HAIRSTON, supra note 63, at 4. Section 235 "reduced the effective interest
rate for homebuyers, depending on their income, to as low as one percent with HUD paying
the remaining interest directly to the bank." THOMPSON, supra note 199, at 3.
203 Carliner, supra note 64, at 313.
201 Id. Down payments could be as low as $200, which was about two weeks' pay for the
median Section 235 purchaser. LOUIS HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA
IN RED INK 226 (2011).
205 BRENT D. RYAN, DESIGN AFTER DECLINE: HOW AMERICA REBUILDS SHRINKING CITIES
92 (2012).
206 See VAN ORDER & YEZER, supra note 36, at 8 ('There were many documented cases of
abuse in which substantial units were given cosmetic rehabilitation and sold to households
who simply could not maintain the units when their flaws became evident.").
207 THOMPSON, supra note 199, at 3.
208 RYAN, supra note 205, at 93.
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The federal government lost over $2 billion on mortgages that
ended up in foreclosure during this period.20 9 The Section 235
fiasco "was one of the major reasons for the moratorium on
subsidized housing programs declared in 1973."210
If the broader dreams of equality of the 1960s were dashed in
the 1970s, so were the dreams of an effective FHA.211 At the same
time the Section 235 fiasco was unfolding, the FHA was rocked by
a series of scandals. 212  Indeed, HIUD Secretary George Romney
called for the FHA to be privatized in 1972, in part because of
problems in the agency and in part because of the growth of the
PMI industry.213
During the early 1970s, the mortgage insurance sector was
subject to big swings in market share between the FHA and
private mortgage insurers.214 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac set the
stage for a revival of the PMI industry in the early 1970s as they
209 Id. See generally NAT'L CTR. FOR Hous. MGMT., supra note 34 (report prepared for
HUD arguing that despite declines the FHA is still integral in the provision of single-family
mortgage insurance).
210 VAN ORDER & YEZER, supra note 36, at 8.
211 See, e.g., Civil Rights Unit Says Housing Bias Study Shows HUD Has Failed to Change
Pattern, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1971, at 10 (" Traditionally attuned to serving the housing
needs of white, middle-class families', the [U.S. Civil Rights Commission] report said, the
FHA 'has been poorly prepared to serve a different racial and ethnic group of home seekers
and has done little to develop affirmative procedures and mechanisms to assure that lower-
income buyers are treated fairly.' ").
212 See, e.g., John Herbers, U.S. Report Finds Fraud in Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1971, at
1, http://www.nytimes.com/1971/01/06/archives/us-report-finds-fraud-in-housing-cites-wide-ab
use-in-federal-home.html? r=0 (reporting on a study by the House Banking and Currency
Committee that found the FHA "allowed speculators to make huge profits at the expense of
the poor in what amounted to 'sheer fraud' "); Former FHA Chief in Philadelphia Named in 2
U.S.- Indictments, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1972, at 2 (reporting that the former director of the
Philadelphia FRA had been indicted on multiple counts of taking bribes and tax evasions);
Monroe W. Karmen, Restoring Cities After the Scandals, WALL ST. J., July 5, 1972, at 8
(describing the failure of programs in urban areas).
213 See, e.g., Karmen, supra note 212, at 8 (stating that Romney advocated for private
investment to save cities).
214 See John Hebers, Romney Recommends Abolition of Federally Subsidized Housing,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1972, at 22, http://query.nytimes.com/mern/archive-free/pdf?.res=9E06
EFD8143EE63ABC4C51DFB6678389669EDE.
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sought to purchase high-LTV mortgages. 215 Because their charters
required that the high-LTV mortgages have mortgage
insurance, 216 private mortgage insurers had a steady stream of
business. 217
Underwriting stabilized toward the end of the 1970s. In 1978,
default rates for the Section 203 program had lowered to 0.89% of
mortgages in force, from 1.69% of mortgages in force in 1970.218
Foreclosures in process by 1978 for the Section 203 program were
0.30% of mortgages in force, a slight decline from the rate at the
end of the previous decade. 219
6. The 1980s: PMI Is Back! Before Gordon Gekko pronounced
that greed is good,220  skepticism for that government
instrumentality, the FHA, blossomed during the Reagan years. At
the beginning of the decade, the FHA and VA had about 20% of the
215 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HouS., supra note 6, at 162-63. See also STEPHEN ROSS & JOHN
YINGER, THE COLOR OF CREDIT: MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, AND
FAIR-LENDING ENFORCEMENT 17 (2002) (In the early 1970s, Fannie Mae's charter was
changed to allow it to buy conventional mortgages, and two new secondary mortgage market
institutions appeared. The Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA, or Ginnie
Mae) was established to purchase FHA and VA mortgages from any source, and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) was established to purchase conventional
mortgages from savings and loans. These institutional developments, along with tremendous
growth in the popularity of MBSs as an investment, have made it possible for mortgage
bankers to move into the conventional market, as well.').
216 12 U.S.C. § 1717(b)(5)(C) (Fannie Mae); 12 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(2) (Freddie Mac).
217 See PROMONTORY FIN. GRP., LLC, supra note 122, at 3 (noting that, unlike the FHA,
Fannie, and Freddie, private mortgage insurers are regulated by state insurance
regulators); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HOuS., supra note 6, at 162-63 (explaining the
attractive financial terms that drew home buyers away from the FHA). Section 201 of the
Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450-51, required that
mortgages purchased by Fannie and Freddie with less than a 20% down payment have
mortgage insurance. For a technical overview of modern private mortgage insurance, see
PROMONTORY FIN. GRP., LLC, supra note 122.
218 DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 1979 HUD STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 113 tbl.21, http:/!
babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=ucl.32106006213851;seq=133;view= lup;num=113.
219 Id.
220 WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987) ("'The point is, ladies and gentleman, that
greed, for lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right, greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts
through, and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed, in all of its forms;
greed for life, for money, for love, knowledge, has marked the upward surge of mankind.
And greed, you mark my words, will not only save Teldar Paper, but that other
malfunctioning corporation called the USA.").
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market (by dollar amount) for new mortgages, and the PMI
industry had about the same market share.221 The FHA's express
mission also changed from its original one of serving a broad
swath of homeowners to one of particularly serving lower-income
households. 222 This transition was not untroubled, as FHA loans
continued to be at the root of big problems in urban
communities. 223
Although the FHA had turned away from its history of racial
discrimination, its record of success in communities of color was
decidedly mixed. In many ways, this disconnect was a problem of
underwriting. FHA underwriting went from being prejudicially
restrictive for households of color in its early years to being
irrationally loose in its later years. The FHA had still not come up
with any sort of approach to its underwriting that balanced access
to credit and sustainability of credit. This failure continued to
haunt the FHA and the communities it served decades after it
rejected its early discriminatory practices.
The FHA faced something of an identity crisis in the early
1980s. President Reagan created a Commission on Housing to
study the FHA and other aspects of the housing sector.224 The
Commission believed that the FHA should cede much of its market
to the PMI industry, which had recovered by then. 225 By 1980, the
PMI industry had grown to fourteen firms226 which had insured
31% of the entire mortgage market. 227 The industry was arguing
221 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HOUS., supra note 6, at 163.
222 See Jaffee & Quigley, supra note 57, at 108 (describing the shift towards lower-income
borrowers).
223 See, e.g., Martin Gottlieb, F.H.A. Case Recalls Bushwick in 70s, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
1986 (describing an FHA mortgage scandal in Brooklyn).
224 Exec. Order No. 12,310, 46 Fed. Reg. 31,869 (June 16, 1981).
225 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HOUS., supra note 6, at xxiv ("Like so much else that is 50
years old, FHA has become a prisoner of its own habits, and the Commission recommends
that more agile private mortgage insurance institutions take over many FRA functions
relating to single-family homes. But there are still pioneering tasks ahead for FlIA in the
Commission's scenario, in the testing of new mortgage instruments and in assistance to
homeowners for whom private insurers are unwilling or unable to supply insurance.").
226 PROMONTORY FIN. GRP., LLC, supra note 122, at 4.
227 FOOTE & HAIRSTON, supra note 63, at 7.
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that FHA had become unnecessary. 228  Indeed, the Reagan
Administration even bandied around a proposal to privatize it.229
At the same time, the FHA's market share began falling to very
low levels, as low as 5% by the mid-1980s.230
The late 1980s told a completely different story, as the PMI
industry faced heavy losses from riskier products such as
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) and from depressed housing
prices in the Farm Belt and the Southwest.2 1  Some PMI
companies merged with better-capitalized ones. 232 One of the
fourteen was not able to fully repay its policyholders. 233 By the
late 1980s, the FIA (as well as the VA) came roaring back, with a
roughly 60% market share of insured loans, leaving the PMI
industry with 40%.234 But the private mortgage insurance
industry, like the Reagan-era Arnold Schwarzenegger, was already
prepared to say, "I'll be back!"235
During the late 1980s, the FHA's delinquency and foreclosure
rates were about twice those for conventional loans.236 Reflecting
its changed mission, the FHA began keeping statistics on the
number of mortgages going to first-time homebuyers. By 1991,
58% of FHA single-family insured mortgages went to first-time
homebuyers. 237
7. The 1990s: The FHA Goes Out with a Whimper. As the
Soviet Union collapsed in the face of triumphant capitalism, the
228 Id. at 3.
229 See, e.g., Robert Pear, Reagan Proposes Selling off F.H.A. to Private Bidder, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1985, http://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/14/us/reagan-proposes-selling-off-fha-to-privat
e-bidder.html (noting that the President's fiscal budget proposed selling the FHA by 1989);
Joann S. Lublin, Opposition Shelves Budget Office's Plan to Sell FHA, WALL ST. J., at 1 (Dec.
20, 1985) (reporting that housing officials and others opposed Reagan's plan).
230 Immergluck, supra note 142, at 6.
231 Eric N. Berg, Upheaval at Mortgage Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1988, http://www.ny
times.com/1988/03/03/business/upheaval-at-mortgage-insurers.html.
232 DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 7, at 176.
233 PROMONTORY FIN. GRP., LLC, supra note 122, at 4.
234 Berg, supra note 231.
235 THE TERMINATOR (Orion Pictures 1984).
2%0 DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 7, at 156 tbl.8-1.
237 DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., FHA ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT FISCAL YEAR
1992, at 39 (1992) (detailing the previous year's statistic for first-time homebuyers).
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FHA looked as if it would collapse in the face of a resurgent PMI
industry. The FHA arrived in the 1990s with the legacy of high
default rates and a variety of other problems. 238 The Cranston-
Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 implemented
more conservative underwriting standards for mortgages and the
FHA's insurance funds. 239 The FHA's share of the mortgage
market continued to face serious competition from the PMI
industry. Over much of the decade, the FHA and the PMI
industry each had a share of the total mortgage market that was
measured in the teens.240
By the late 1990s, the nine remaining private mortgage
insurers241 insured about the same number of mortgages as the
FHA and the VA combined and more than twice the dollar amount
of mortgage debt than the FHA and the other government
insurance programs combined. 242 And it looked like the PMI
industry had nowhere to go but up: the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) found that a third of the FHA's 1995
portfolio would have been eligible for PMI.2 43
During the late 1990s, the FHA's delinquency and foreclosure
rates were often more, and sometimes much more, than three
times as high as those for conventional loans.244 In 2000, FHA
mortgages were about three-fourths the size of PMI mortgages. 245
This reflected the market segmentation of the two, with the FHA
having a bigger share of low- and moderate-income households.
238 Defaults and other operational problems led to a decrease in the MMI Fund's net worth
from $7.8 billion in 1980 to $2.6 billion in 1989 (in constant 1989 dollars). U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HUD REFORMS: PROGRESS MADE SINCE THE HUD SCANDALS BUT
MUCH WORK REMAINS 30-31 (1992).
239 Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 332, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990) (amending Section 205 to ensure
MMIF meets new capital ratio requirements).
240 Immergluck, supra note 142, at 4 (noting the FHA market share was between 15%-
20%); FOOTE & HAIRSTON, supra note 63, at 7 (noting PMI market share averaged 13%
during this decade).
241 PROMONTORY FIN. GRP., LLC, supra note 122, at 38.
242 DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 7, at 174, tbl.9-1.
243 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 66, at 4.
244 DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 7, at 156 tbl.8-1.
245 Id. at 177, tbl.9-2 (noting that the FHA average loan amount was $100,344, PM was
$131,964 and VA was $118,953).
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8. The 2000s: The FHA Goes Boom! Good times in the booming
financial markets of the early 2000s meant lean times for the
FHA.246 While the mortgage market was heating up overall, the
FHA's share of mortgage originations by dollar volume fell from its
1970 peak of roughly 25% to its 2006 trough of less than 2%.247
This long-term decline had begun in earnest in 1996 and was most
pronounced among minority borrowers who were moving over to
the private-label subprime market which was dramatically
loosening its underwriting standards and offering extremely
attractive teaser rates as well.248 Before this subprime boom, the
FHA's low-down-payment mortgages and less stringent credit
score requirements had meant that the FHA had a larger market
share in those communities that had been underrepresented
among homeowners.2 49 During this same period, the FHA decided
to originate loans with down payments funded by sellers which
were channeled through various not-for-profit organizations. 250
246 SARAH ROSEN WARTELL, MILLENNIAL Hous. COMM'N, SINGLE-FAMILY RISKSHARING: AN
EVALUATION OF ITS POTENTIAL AS A TOOL FOR FHA 16-41 (2002) (detailing the FHA's
operational weaknesses and riskier loan practices in the 2000s).
247 Jaffee & Quigley, supra note 57, at 106. Not as dramatically, but still shockingly, the
VA's market share (by dollar volume) in 2006 fell to less than 1%. Id.
248 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-645 FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION,
DECLINE IN THE AGENCY'S MARKET SHARE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH PRODUCT AND PROCESS
DEVELOPMENTS OF OTHER MORTGAGE MARKET PARTICIPANTS 4 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d07645.pdf.
249 See Jaffee & Quigley, supra note 57, at 108 ("[The overwhelming fraction of FRA
borrowers have obtained mortgages with LTV ratios of 95 to 98 percent or more, including a
large number of borrowers with 'nontraditional' credit histories or with imperfect credit
records. The academic literature has documented these specific attributes of the FRA
clientele. For example, Ambrose and Pennington-Cross (2000) found that FHA market
shares are higher in cities with higher economic risk characteristics, while Ambrose,
Pennington-Cross, and Yezer (2002) found that as local economic conditions deteriorate,
conventional lenders tend to withdraw mortgage finance, in effect making the government
programs the only source of credit.").
250 DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE
FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE FHA MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND 11 (2009), http://www.
hud.gov/offices/hsg/rmra/oe/rpts/actr/2009actr-subltr.pdf. With a typical seller-funded down
payment transaction, the seller gives a third party an amount equal to the buyer's down
payment. The third party then gives the funds to the buyer who uses it for a down payment.
This structure allowed the parties to avoid legal limitations on seller-paid down payments.
See generally Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-24, MORTGAGE FINANCING: ADDITIONAL
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Such loans were no-down-payment loans by another name, as the
third party paid the down payment, leaving the borrower with no
skin in the game. These loans, unsurprisingly, defaulted at very
high rates.251
The national homeownership rate peaked in the mid-2000s at
about 69%.252 The FHA was part of that dramatic expansion. For
instance, 79.8% of FRA-insured purchases were first-time
homebuyers in 2001.253 But the FHA's success with communities
of color, since the rejection of its explicitly discriminatory
practices, remained decidedly mixed. Although African American
homeownership had increased significantly since the FHA's
creation, it was about twenty percentage points behind the
national rate in 2006, as was the rate for Hispanic households. 254
The FHA's competitors were themselves lowering down
payment requirements to as little as zero; the FHA responded by
in some cases offering insurance for financing of nearly 100% of
the sales price.255 PMI had 62% of the mortgage insurance market
ACTION NEEDED TO MANAGE RISKS OF FHA-INSURED LOANS WITH DowN PAYMENT
ASSISTANCE 3-6 (2005) (noting that HUD does not monitor the use of seller-funded down
payment loans and recommending more routine monitoring). Unsurprisingly, the purchase
price typically accounted for the seller-funded down payment by selling for 2% to 3% more
than similar homes sold without seller-funded down payments. GovWT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-07-1033T, MORTGAGE FINANCING: SELLER-FUNDED DOWN-PAYMENT ASSISTANCE
CHANGES THE STRUCTURE OF THE PURCHASE TRANSACTION AND NEGATIVELY AFFECTS LOAN
PERFORMANCE 3 (2007).
251 DEP'T OF HouS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 250, at 11. They were also very popular: "The
proportion of FHA-insured purchase loans that were financed in part by down-payment
assistance from various sources increased from 35 percent to nearly 50 percent from 2000
through 2004." GOVr ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1033T, supra note 250, at 2.
252 THOMPSON, supra note 199, at 14 fig. .6.
253 DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FHA ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT FISCAL YEAR
2001, at 7 (2001). A typical first-time homebuyer "is at the beginning of his or her income-
earning years, does not have substantial accumulated wealth and retirement funds, and has
other consumer debt." DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 7, at 175.
254 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSING VACANCIES & IHOMEOWNERSHIP (CPSHVS): HISTORICAL
TABLES tbl.16, http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/data/histtabs.html (last visited Aug. 31,
2016) (noting that in the "3rd Quarter of 2006, the African American rate was 48.6%, the
Hispanic rate was 49.7%, and the national average was 69%").
255 See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-708, FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION:
MODERNIZATION PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE PROGRAM AND BUDGET IMPLICATIONS AND
REQUIRE CONTINUED IMPROVEMENTS IN RISK MANAGEMENT 9, 20-21, 27 (2007), http://
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by the mid-2000s. 256 Subprime lenders pushed the envelope,
offering mortgages with flexible payment and variable interest
options that were particularly attractive to purchasers in areas
with rapidly rising prices. 257 Some mortgage insurers were going
so far as to underwrite loans with LTVs of 100% and even 103%.258
In response to changes in the industry, and to further expand
homeownership, Congress enacted the American Dream
Downpayment Act of 2003.259 This new program gave first-time
homeowners up to $10,000 as a down payment. 260 This program,
like the 1970s' Section 235 program, was an unmitigated failure
for homeowners and a financial catastrophe for the FHA. Once
again, a no-down-payment loan program failed.261 That being said,
"with the exception of the years during the subprime boom," the
203(b) program, the FHA's primary mortgage insurance program
for single family homes, "served as the major source of mortgage
financing for first-time, low-income and minority homebuyers. '262
HUD continued to scramble to respond to the changes in the
market, proposing to Congress a variety of long-due reforms in
www.gao.gov/new.items/d07708.pdf. Some mortgage industry officials also pointed to other
product restrictions as a reason why FHA loans have been less competitive than
conventional loans. Many borrowers either cannot or do not want to make a down payment,
and "in recent years, members of the conventional mortgage market [such as private
mortgage insurers, the housing GSEs (govern ment-sponsored enterprises), and large
private lenders] increasingly have been active in supporting low- and no-down-payment
mortgages." Id. at 9. For example, the GSEs introduced no-down-payment mortgage
products in 2000. In contrast, FHA did not offer a zero-down-payment product, which some
lenders and industry observers have cited as a major factor underlying the decline in FHA's
market share. Id. at 31. However, as previously noted, FHA allows borrowers to finance
their up-front insurance premium and some closing costs; as a result, an FHA-insured loan
could equal nearly 100% of the property's value or sales price. Id. at 27.
256 DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 7, at 178.
257 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 255, at 9.
258 DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 7, at 178.
259 American Dream Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 108-186, 117 Stat. 2685 (2003).
260 VAN ORDER & YEZER, supra note 36, at 8.
261 See id. ("Subsequently it proved approximately as long-lived as the Section 235
program, i.e., it was terminated in 2007.").
262 ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., UNC CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL AND CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING RESEARCH 2012, BALANCING RISK AND ACCESS: UNDERWRITING STANDARDS FOR
QUALIFIED RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES 6.
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2006.263 Echoing the FHA's consumer protection goals from the
Great Depression, Congress passed the Expanding
Homeownership Act of 2007 to help FHA modernize, "to make
government-insured loan products competitive with the private
sector and make available affordable housing to more
Americans . ,,264 In particular, this modernized FHA was
intended to "provide a safe, fair, and affordable FHA alternative to
the subprime market."265  Not incidentally, the legislation also
allowed the FHA to reduce the minimum 3% down payment
requirement. 266 These efforts to compete with the private sector on
its terms turned out to be a big mistake.
Events soon overtook Congress as the FHA's dramatic loss of
market share was soon to be matched by an equally dramatic rise.
Once the subprime crisis hit, government-insured mortgages
absorbed an extraordinary level of demand for mortgages as the
private-label (non-conforming subprime and jumbo) sector
shriveled to next to nothing.267
By 2008, the FHA and the VA had a market share of all
mortgage originations of more than 20%.268 Congress significantly
raised the loan limits that the FHA could insure to provide
263 See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 248, at 1 (noting that HUD proposed to
"raise FHA's loan limits, give the agency flexibility to set insurance premiums based on the
credit risk of borrowers, and reduce down-payment requirements from the current 3 percent
to potentially zero").
264 GINNIE MAE, supra note 71, at 11.
265 Id.
266 Id. See also FED. Hous. ADMIN., supra note 53, at 5 (the FHA's Annual Management
Report for fiscal year 2007 states that its key policy objectives include increasing FHA loan
limits and enhancing "downpayment flexibility requirements").
267 See VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., GUARANTEED TO FAIL: FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND
THE DEBACLE OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 9-10 (2011) ("As of the first half of 2010, Fannie and
Freddie plus the FHA were buying or guaranteeing more than 90% of all residential
mortgages that were originated."). By 2013, that number has shrunk a bit to 80%, with the
FHA and VA accounting for twenty percentage points between them. JOINT C'R. FOR HOUS.
STUDIES, HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 2013, at 11 (2013). "Non-
conforming loans" are those that do not conform to Fannie and Freddie purchase guidelines;
"jumbo" mortgages are non-conforming loans that do not comply with the limitations on the
size of the mortgages that Fannie and Freddie can purchase. Reiss, supra 9, at 1032, 1033
n.61.
268 Jaffee & Quigley, supra note 57, at 106.
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liquidity to a wider swath of the mortgage market.26 9 The FHA's
market share continued to explode as capital from other sources in
the residential mortgage market dried up. 270 By 2010 it was 30%
overall 271 and nearly 40% for home purchases. 272 The FHA's role
in home purchases for minorities during this period was even
greater: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data indicates
that 60% of all African American and Latino purchasers had FHA-
insured mortgages. 273 This homeownership rate was nearly an
exponential increase from 2005 and 2006 where 10% of African
American and just 6% of Hispanic purchasers had FHA loans. 274
More broadly, the FHA had "become the primary lender to
borrowers with down payments of less than 20 percent, lifting its
share of mortgage originations to nearly 20 percent" in 2010.275
This dramatic increase in market share was soon followed by an
equally dramatic increase in defaults and foreclosures on FHA
mortgages. 276 This poor performance resulted from bad programs,
269 See INTEGRATED FIN. ENG'G, INC., supra note 112, at 5-6 (discussing the Economic
Stimulus Act of 2008's increased loan limits). In 2006, the MMI Fund accounted for about
90% of the FHA's entire portfolio. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 113, at 1.
270 Private-label MBS issuance was $930 billion in fiscal year 2007, the year the credit
crisis began, and had fallen to $58 billion in fiscal year 2010. GINNIE MAE, REPORT TO
CONGRESS FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 12 (2010); GINNIE MAE, REPORT TO CONGRESS FISCAL YEAR
2008, at 10 (2008), http://www.ginniemae.gov/about/ann-rep/ReportToCongress08.pdf (' The
evaporation of the private-label securitization market has resulted in virtually no capital for
nonconforming loans."). During the same time, the government-supported MBS insurers
(Ginnie, Fannie, and Freddie) saw their issuance grow to $1.3 trillion in fiscal year 2010
from $1.1 trillion in fiscal year 2007. GINNIE MAE, 2010, supra, at 12.
271 HAMP Changes, Revamped GSE Plan Expected as Housing Woes Continue, BNA
BANING REP., at 5 (Jan. 25, 2010). See also DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEv., supra note 250,
at 1 ("FHA was largely shut-out of the mortgage market during the boom years of 2003-2007,
but has now emerged as a primary source of credit guarantees both for home buyers and for
homeowners seeking to refinance into lower-cost and safer mortgage products.").
272 DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE
FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE FHA MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND FISCAL YEAR 2010, at
ii (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/rmra/oe/rpts/actr/2010actr-subltr.pdf.
273 Id. at 6. HMDA requires certain lenders to report information about home loan
applicants and the loans for which they apply. See generally Home Mortgage Disclosure
(Regulation C), 12 C.F.R. § 203 (2014).
274 DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 272, at 6.
275 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, supra note 267, at 10.
276 HAMP Changes, supra note 271, at 1-2.
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such as the American Dream Downpayment initiative, as well as
from the general meltdown of the housing markets in the late
2000s.277 As a result, it was expected that the FHA's massive MMI
fund was "unlikely to meet its statutory capital requirements by
the end of' the 2009 fiscal year.278 It soon appeared that the MMI
Fund was in great distress, "[a]ll of the annual books-of-business
from 2000 through 2008 are expected to result in net losses over
the life of the loan guarantees, but the largest losses will be from
the 2004-2008 books."279  The Gyourko and Aragon studies
discussed above offer detailed, depressing prognoses for the MMI
Fund.28 0
While the FHA was riding this rollercoaster, the PMI industry
was on one of its own. The industry peaked in 2003, and then
shrank dramatically as a result of the subprime crisis. 28 ' Some
firms went into bankruptcy because of mounting claims on
defaulting mortgages, and some were barred by their regulators
from selling new policies. 2 2 Indeed, the industry was considered
to be "crippled" by the crisis, being hit by the financial equivalent
277 Id.
278 Michael Goldberg & Ann Schnare, An Update on the Capital Adequacy of the FHA
Single Family Insurance Program 1 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1510387; see Michael
Goldberg & Ann B. Schnare, An Alternative Look at the Financial Strength of the FHA
Single Family Insurance Program (Nov. 18, 2008) (source may be requested at http://www.
researchgate.net/publication/256604066 An Alternative look at the FinancialStrength-o
f the FHA Single Family-Insurance Program).
279 DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 272, at 23. See also Peter M. Zorn &
Marsha J. Courchane, Mortgage Market Players and Products 16, Address at U.C. Irvine
Housing After the Fall: Re-Assessing the Future of the American Dream (rev. Aug. 13,
2009) (presented at Housing After the Fall: Re-Assessing the Future of the American
Dream University of California - Irvine, rev. Aug. 13, 2009), http://merage.uci.edu/Resear
chAndCenters/CRE/Resources/DocumentslZorn-Courchane.pdf (arguing that because the
FHA did not significantly tighten its underwriting standards, it "likely will experience
significant credit costs issues from its most recent books of originations').
?m See supra text accompanying notes 43-48.
281 Kathleen Pender, National Ml to Get Fannie, Freddie Loans, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 2013.
282 Clea Benson & Zachary Tracer, FHA Pullback Boosts Mortgage Insurers Once Seen
Failing, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 7, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/2013-03-07/fha-pullba
ck-boosts-mortgage-insurers-once-seen-failing.html; Pender, supra note 281.
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of a hurricane. 283 As the housing markets recovered, so did the
PMI industry, 28 4 but it was not able to support the housing market
during the crisis in the way that the government-backed FHA was
able to.
The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 barred the
FHA from insuring mortgages in transactions involving seller-
financed down payment assistance which was at the root of so
much of the FHA's massive losses in the 2000s.285  It also
increased the minimum down payment to 3.5%.286 And it began
tightening its underwriting.28 7 Finally, Congress authorized the
FHA in 2010 to raise its premiums, which also helped to stabilize
its financial health.288
For the years 2006-2012, the FHA's losses as a percent of its
total debt outstanding was 17.3%, much higher than Fannie and
Freddie's 3.9% but a bit lower than the private-label MBS sector's
20.3%.289 The FHA continued to serve first-time and lower-income
homebuyers, consistent with its change in focus in its later years.
In fiscal year 2011, "75 percent of FHA purchase-loan
endorsements were first-time homebuyers, which [was] a 5 percent
decline from fiscal year 2010."290 And in 2011, 59.2% of its insured
borrowers were classified as low/moderate income, again reflecting
the mission of the modern FHA.291
283 Pender, supra note 281. For a more nuanced discussion of the effect of the financial
crisis on the private mortgage insurance industry, see PROMONTORY FIN. GRP., LLC, supra
note 122, at 41-42.
284 Benson & Tracer, supra note 282.
285 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 2113, 122 Stat.
2654 (2008) (amending section 203(b)(9) of the National Housing Act). See generally GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1033T, supra note 250 (describing impacts of seller-
financed down-payments).
286 Housing and Economic Recovery Act § 2113.
287 INTEGRATED FIN. ENG'G, INC., supra note 112, at 3.
288 Act of Aug. 11, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-229, 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. (124 Stat. 2483).
289 Jonathan R. Laing, Fannie, Freddie: On Borrowed Time, BARRON'S, July 29, 2013.
290 DEP't OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., FHA ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT FIscAL YEAR 2011,
at 8 (2011), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportaldocuments/huddoc?id=fhafyllannualmgmntrpt.
pdf.
291 Id. at 9.
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9. The 2010s: The Reckoning. As the financial crisis recedes
from memory, the FHA is hailed in heroic terms for expanding so
rapidly in the face of the retreat of private capital from the
mortgage market. It is also pilloried so mightily for the massive
losses it suffered because of its loose underwriting in the early
2000s. These losses resulted in the FHA's first bailout in its eighty
year history.
The FHA began to tighten its underwriting standards after its
defaults began to rise.292 Because of its poor financial position, the
FHA also raised its premiums. 293 The MMI Fund's financial
condition had been poor since 2009, when it failed to meet its
required 2% minimum capital ratio.294
PMI began to make a comeback in 2010 when it insured 4.3% of
all new mortgages. 295 By 2013, its market share grew to 11.3%.296
The FHA continued to focus on first-time homebuyers. In 2012,
about 78% of its loans went to that population and about 32% were
households of color.297
This history of the FHA accomplishes a number of goals. First,
it demonstrates, contrary to conventional wisdom, that the FHA's
mission was actually many missions from its very start. Second, it
demonstrates, again contrary to conventional wisdom, that the
FHA added and shed missions over the years, some of which were
big successes while others were big failures. Third, it
demonstrates the FHA's ability to respond rapidly to systemic
failure in the housing finance market, particularly when compared
with the PMI industry. Fourth, it documents the FHA's very
292 Bob Tedeschi, F.H.A. Lending Standards Tightened, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/realestate/3lmort.html.
293 Lynnley Browning, F.H.A. Rule Changes for Mortgage Borrowers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/1 1/28/realestate/mortgages/28Mort.html.
294 Gov'T AccoUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 69, at 7 fig.2.
295 Bob Tedeschi, Private Mortgage Insurance Easier to Obtain, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/realestate/30mort.html; Mike Ferullo, Private Mortgage
Insurers Seek More Clout With Launch of New Trade Association, BNA BANING REP., Mar.
18, 2014, at 451 (reporting market share for 2010).
296 Ferullo, supra note 295.
297 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 69, at 4.
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troubled history of discrimination as well as misguided attempts to
remedy past discrimination. Finally, and most importantly to this
Article, it demonstrates the importance of responsible
underwriting to the FHA's success, however one chooses to
measure it.
The FHA has an important part to play in the mortgage
market, but that part is not so clear, given its history. It is clear,
at least, that the PMI industry is not capable of assuming all of
the roles played by the FIA. The next section addresses a central
component of the FHA's mission: making homeownership available
to a broader swath of households. It identifies the flaws that have
developed in the FHA's underwriting of single-family mortgages
and how those flaws can be addressed, with the goal of charting a
course forward for the FHA as it leaves the Great Recession
behind.
IV. UNDERWRITING SUSTAINABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP
The modern FHA states that its mission is to serve borrowers
that the conventional mortgage market does not serve effectively:
"[flirst-time homebuyers, minorities, low-income families and
residents of underserved communities. ' '298 More concretely, in the
midst of the Great Recession, it set performance goals of
increasing homeownership opportunities and strengthening
communities. 299 For instance, to achieve these goals, the FHA set
and exceeded a goal of insuring over 1.4 million single-family
mortgages in the fiscal year (FY) of 2009; set and exceeded a goal
of having 73% of its single-family mortgages go to first-time
homebuyers; set and almost achieved its goal of having 33% of its
single-family mortgages go to minority households; set and
298 FED. Hous. ADMIN., supra note 8, at 3. See also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, POLICY
OPTIONS FOR THE HOUSING AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 23 (2008), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
90xx/doc9078/04-11-Housing-withLetter.pdf (noting that the FHA "has a long tradition of
assisting borrowers who would generally be considered candidates for today's troubled
subprime and alt-A loans").
299 FED. HOUS. ADMIN., ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 18-20
(2009), http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/fhafyO9annualmanagementreport.pdf.
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achieved a goal of having 35% of its single-family mortgages be in
underserved communities. 300
Sadly, it does not seem that the FHA got it, even in the
aftermath of the financial crisis. By having homeownership goals
drive its underwriting, it is bound to repeat the fiscal calamities of
the past. What is needed-what all of the commentators agree
upon-is for appropriate underwriting to drive the FRA. This
position is not to say that promoting homeownership for various
groups is not a legitimate goal. But rather it can do more harm
than good to the FRA itself and the homeowners it serves if it is
not done in a way that avoids frequent default and foreclosure.
A key element of appropriate underwriting is the downpayment
requirement, as expressed in the LTV ratio. Indeed, as seen
above, there is a strong correlation between low LTV and low
default rates over the FHA's eighty year history. From an
underwriting perspective, a 20% down payment is great.30 1 It
keeps defaults very low. But it is very hard for low- and moderate-
income families to save enough money in a reasonable amount of
time to put together a 20% downpayment. The median household
income in 2013 was $51,939.302 The median house price in 2013
for existing homes was about $198,000 at the end of 2013.303 It
would take quite some time for that median household to save the
roughly $40,000 necessary to have a 20% downpayment on that
median house. High downpayment requirements would also have
a disproportionate effect on communities of color, which tend to
300 Id.
301 Downpayments have a signaling effect in addition to providing an equity cushion. See
DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 7, at 132 (stating that a downpayment "from accumulated
savings, investments, retirement funds, or equity in another home sold is generally earned
over time," and it "provides a good indication of the applicants' ability to handle debt and
manage their income").
302 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, P60-249, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013, at 5
(2014).
303 NAT'L ASS'N OF REALTORS, December Existing-Home Sales Rise, 2013 Strongest in
Seven Years (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.realtor.org/news-releases/2014/01/December-existi
ng-home-sales-rise-2013-strongest-in-seven-years ("The median existing-home price for all
housing types in December was $198,000, up 9.9 percent from December 2012.").
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have lower income and less wealth than white households. 30 4 As
seen above, there have been periodic pushes to decrease
downpayment requirements in order to increase homeownership
rates, but those pushes have not been accompanied by an
evaluation of the sustainability of that increase. 30 5
Advocates for low-income communities, lenders, and advocates
of an "ownership society" have all pushed for much lower
downpayment requirements, particularly for first-time
homeowners. This has occurred, most notably, in the late 1960s
and late 1990s, but also as veterans returned from World War II.
Some of these pushes are accompanied by little thought as to the
impact that low downpayments have on the likelihood that a
household will keep its home over the long term. Others are more
thoughtful, and are based on empirical research. Let us dismiss
the first set out of hand, for there have been a number of low- or
no-downpayment initiatives that have been unmitigated
failures. 306
Let us begin by addressing the criticisms of low-downpayment
initiatives. The flaws with the FHA that commentators such as
Van Order & Yezer and Pinto have identified are almost
completely flaws of ultra-low or no-downpayment initiatives.
Throwing the baby out with the bathwater, their prescription is to
end innovative homeownership programs. Instead, the focus
should be on the predictors of default, and in particular, the
scholarly literature regarding the relationship between low
downpayments and default. It is clear that the FRA (and the VA)
have had success with relatively small downpayments at times, as
have other entities such as the Self-Help Credit Union. 30 7
301 CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, GOVERNMENT-MANDATED DOwN PAYMENT STANDARDS
WOULD HARM THE ECONOMY, DENY HOMEOWNERSMIP TO CREDIT-WORTHY FAMILIES (2013),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/polcy-legislation/congress/CRL-Down-P
ayment-Mandates-Would-Harm-the-Economy-Credit-Worthy-Families-A ugust-13-2013.pdf.
305 See supra text accompanying notes 246-67.
06' See, e.g., supra Part III.B (discussing several FHA initiatives and their varying degrees
of success).
307 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 168 (noting that Congress lowered down
payment to 3% in some cases in the 1950s); UNC CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, SETTING THE
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Much of the downpayment literature is focused on how lowering
downpayment requirements increases homeownership rates.308
But there is also a substantial body of literature that indicates
that no-downpayment and low-downpayment mortgages are much
more likely to default than mortgages with larger
downpayments. 3 9 One article by Austin Kelly stands out for
studying mortgage default rates where the borrower has made no
downpayment. It confirms what seems intuitive: "[b]orrowers who
provide even modest downpayments from their own resources have
substantially lower default propensities than do borrowers whose
downpayments come from relatives, government agencies, or
nonprofits. 310  This finding-that "skin in the game" reduces
defaults-implies that borrowers will assess the risk of purchasing
a home more carefully if their own capital is at risk and will fight
harder to keep their homes in order to protect that capital. 311
Otherwise a home purchase looks more like a long-term lease with
an option to purchase should prices rise.
RECORD STRAIGHT ON HOMEOWNERSHIP 1-4 (Policy Brief, undated), http://ccc.sites.unc.edul
files/2013/02/Setting-Record-StraightHO.pdf (studying Self Help Credit Union Community
Advantage Program portfolio of 46,000 home-purchase mortgages over a ten year period);
ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., REGAINING THE DREAM: HOW TO RENEW THE PROMISE OF
HOMEOWNERSHIP FOR AMERICA'S WORKING FAMILIES 26-33 (2011) (discussing the success of
the Self-Help Community Advantage Program).
308 See, e.g., 0. Emre Ergungor, Homeownership for the Long Run An Analysis of
Homeowner Subsidies 1, 25 (Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 10-21R,
2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1723445 (examining the impact of interest-rate and down-
payment subsidies on default rates and losses given default); Christopher E. Herbert &
Winnie Tsen, The Potential of Downpayment Assistance for Increasing Homeownership
Among Minority and Low-Income Households, 9 CITYSCAPE 153 (2007), http://ssrn.com/abst
ract=1084122; Mark S. Doms & John Krainer, Innovations in Mortgage Markets and
Increased Spending on Housing (Fed. Res. Bank of San Francisco, Working Paper No. 2007-
05, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract-1007830.
309 For a somewhat dated survey of the literature, see GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-05-194, MORTGAGE FINANCING: ACTIONS NEEDED TO HELP FHA MANAGE RISKS FROM
NEW MORTGAGE LOAN PRODUCTS 4 (2005). The GAO found that FHA mortgages with LTVs
of 97% to 100% had default rates that were "about 1.75 times the average FHA default
rate." Id. at 29.
310 Austin Kelly, "Skin in the Game": Zero Downpayment Mortgage Default, 17 J. HOuS.
RES. 75, 75 (2008).
311 See id. at 86 (finding that when a buyer funded the downpayment, the 90-day
delinquency rate was significantly lower than loans with gift downpayments).
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The question, of course, is what is the socially optimal level for
down payments? 312 No one has answered this question in the
context of the FHA, but a body of research about down payments
has recently sprung up as various parties have attempted to
influence the rulemakings that define "Qualified Mortgages" (QM)
and "Qualified Residential Mortgages" (QRM) pursuant to Dodd-
Frank.313
The Center for Responsible Lending, an advocate for low- and
moderate-income borrowers that also engages in serious research
on lending issues, has looked at the question of whether very low
downpayments are unacceptably risky. It starts out by noting that
"it would take the typical family 22 years to save for a 10% down
payment, and 14 years for a 5% down payment."31 4 In a study of
its affiliate-lender's record of borrower defaults, researchers found
that "72% of borrowers made a down payment of less than 5
percent," but they were delinquent less than a quarter of the rate
of subprime ARM borrowers.31 5
Some evidence exists that there is a downpayment sweet spot of
around 5% at which default rates are within an acceptable
range. 31 6 The Coalition for a Sensible Housing Policy, a coalition of
lenders and consumer advocates, argues that:
312 The socially optimal level of downpayments may vary, of course, based upon different
conditions. For instance, it might be lower during a recession. That is an issue better
suited for an economist, and not this lawyer, to address.
313 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (summarizing the purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act). See also
Reiss, supra note 78, at 721 (discussing Qualified Mortgage and Qualified Residential
Mortgage rulemakings).
314 CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 304, at 1 (emphasis omitted). See DENNIS
& PINKOWISH, supra note 7, at 132 (As a general rule, the secondary mortgage market is
interested in establishing that an applicant either saved or obtained through housing price
appreciation at least 5 percent of the down payment for the mortgage loan.").
315 UNC CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, supra note 307, at 1. See also QUERCIA ET AL., supra
note 307, at 7-12 (reviewing experience of the Self-Help Credit Union in providing
sustainable mortgages for low-income households).
316 See COAL. FOR SENSIBLE HOUS. POLICY, PROPOSED QUALIFIED RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE
DEFINITION HARMS CREDITWORTHY BORROWERS WHILE FRUSTRATING HOUSING RECOVERY 6
(2011), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislation/regulators/Coal
ition-QRM-White-Paper-l.pdf (noting that from 5% down to 10% down does not greatly reduce
the risk of loss).
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once you apply the strong underwriting standards in
the sample QRM definition, moving from a 5 percent to
a 10 percent down payment requirement reduces the
overall default experience by an average of only two- to
three-tenths of one percent for each cohort year.
However, the increase in the minimum down payment
from 5 percent to 10 percent would eliminate from 4 to
7 percent of borrowers from qualifying for a lower rate
QRM loan. 17
The higher requirements would also have a strongly
disproportionate effect on communities of color.318
Quercia et al. have looked at the trade-offs between safe
underwriting and access to credit in the context of the QRM
rules.319 They have also developed a useful metric, which they
refer to as a "benefit ratio." The benefit ratio compares "the
percent reduction in the number of defaults to the percent
reduction in the number of borrowers who would have access to
QRM mortgages. ' 320 A metric of this sort would go a long way to
ensuring that there is transparency for both homeowners and
policymakers as to the likelihood that homeowners can pay their
mortgages and keep their homes.
Quercia et al. would push the optimal downpayment size even
lower, arguing that "LTVs of 97 percent result in a better benefit
ratio, suggesting that a small downpayment requirement may
have an important protective effect against default risk while still
317 Id. See also QUERCIA ET AL., supra note 262, at 27-28.
318 QUERCIA ET AL., supra note 262, at 27-28 ("[W]e find that imposing a 10 percent
downpayment requirement would eliminate 38 percent of performing loans from the QRM
market, and that at the 20 percent downpayment threshold, 61 percent would be
excluded.... [fimposing a 20 percent downpayment requirement on QM loans would
prevent three-quarters of African Americans and 70 percent of Latinos from qualifying for a
QRM mortgage, compared with 60 percent of non-Hispanic whites and 51 percent of Asians.
Our analysis shows that these borrowers would be excluded from the QRM market even
though they could be successful homeowners.").
319 Id. at 20.
320 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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providing broad access to mortgage credit. '321 They conclude that
"restricting the origination of risky loan features and underwriting
a loan with a consideration of a borrower's ability to repay has the
largest benefit in terms of reducing default risk without limiting
access to credit."322
We need to ask some questions before applying this research to
the FHA mortgage. The first question is-what are we trying to
achieve with FRA underwriting? The second is-what is the best
technical way to achieve that goal? And the final question is-
what political realities can interfere with that approach? Let us
take the three questions in turn.
A. GOALS OF FHA UNDERWRITING
There are three generally agreed-upon goals for FHA
underwriting: (a) FHA insurance should not require support from
the public fisc; (b) the FHA should use lower-risk eligible
borrowers to cross-subsidize higher-risk eligible borrowers; and (c)
the class of eligible borrowers should be limited to those with a
321 Id. at 33. They reached this result after examining "the impacts of various proposed
QRM underwriting standards on access to credit." Id. at 4. The authors acknowledge the
limits of their study:
this analysis does not model the dynamic nature of mortgage and housing
markets, so it is necessarily an incomplete accounting of what may happen
under various QRM guidelines. As the recent period taught us, changes in
the cost and terms of credit can have a significant impact on mortgage
demand and consumer behavior. For some borrowers, the difference in cost
between a QRM and non-QRM loan may not limit access to
homeownership; instead, it may change their housing cost calculus and
either lead them to take out the more expensive, non-QRM mortgage or buy
a less expensive house, or it may simply delay their decision to buy a house.
For other borrowers, the inability to obtain a QRM-loan may exclude them
from the homeownership market entirely. We also don't model the impact
of QRM on housing demand; restrictive thresholds could reduce housing
demand, which in turn could reduce house prices further (thereby limiting
the ability of current owners to sell their house) and prompt additional
foreclosures.
Id. at 5.
322 Id. at 4.
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reasonable likelihood of not defaulting on their loan.323 These
three goals, taken together, reflect a view that the FHA's long-
term health depends on it navigating longstanding political
debates over the "ownership society,"324 wealth redistribution, and
consumer protection regulation. The debate over the appropriate
role of the FHA is often driven by broader ideological agendas,3 25
so it would be helpful for those scholars commenting on it to make
clear whether they agree or disagree with these three goals. To be
clear: I think all three goals are appropriate and politically feasible
for the FHA.
The first goal, that FHA insurance should not require support
from the public fisc, has been part of the FHA's mission since it
was created. 326 The FHA's financial difficulties have not been
sympathetically received in the Capitol. Moreover, the current
political environment is one in which there are frequent calls to
end Fannie and Freddie resounding in the Capitol after the two
companies needed extraordinary support from taxpayers during
the Subprime Crisis.327 It is hard, in this environment, to imagine
a politically feasible alternative to a self-supporting FHA.328
The second goal, that the FHA should use lower-risk eligible
borrowers to cross-subsidize higher-risk eligible borrowers, has
323 DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 250, at 1 (noting that the FHA's MMIF is
self-supporting); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HOUS., supra note 6, at 162 (discussing FHA
cross-subsidization); DEP'T OF HOuS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 163, at 117 (noting that
Section 203 foreclosures in 1950 were 0.04% of mortgages in force).
324 See generally David J. Reiss, First Principles for an Effective Federal Housing Policy,
35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 795 (2010) (arguing that the principles of federal housing policy
promote and incentivize homeownership).
325 See id. at 800-04 (discussing justifications for housing policy).
326 See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the FHA's conservative underwriting in the 1930s).
327 See, e.g., Laing, supra note 289, at 21.
328 Indeed, the FHA's recent financial troubles, supra notes 49-50, make it even less likely
that Congress would want to provide for a permanent subsidy for the FHA in the current
political environment. See generally STANDARD & POOR'S, U.S. Mortgage Finance Reform
Efforts and the Potential Credit Implications (2013) (discussing three proposals to reform
the mortgage market).
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also been integral to the FHA since its founding. 329 Indeed, the
Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund was designed, per its name, to
be a form of mutual insurance where policyholders spread the risk
of default among themselves. 330 This second goal has also been a
relatively non-controversial one, although one could imagine
alternatives to it.331
Surprisingly, the third goal-ensuring that borrowers do not
default in high numbers-is less of a constant than one might
suppose. 332 The policy of the FHA was surely to err on the side of
low defaults from the 1930s through the 1950s. 333 But starting in
the 1960s, this approach was relaxed, and at times it was
implicitly rejected or ignored.334 This relaxation of standards was
seen with the Section 235 fiasco of the 1970s as well as the
American Dream Downpayment Act debacle of the 2000s.33 5 It
appears that households and communities of color are most
329 See supra Part III.B. 1 (discussing the FHA's creation and its main goals in the 1930s);
see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HoUs., supra note 6, at 162 (noting that cross-
subsidization is "inherent in FHA's single-premium structure").
330 See Cooper, supra note 112, at REl (describing how the MIF operates).
331 For instance, the FHA could stop insuring borrowers who are high credit risks and
thereby lower the cost of credit for remaining borrowers even further by lowering the FHA
insurance premium that they pay. See Edward J. Pinto, The FHA is a Predatory Lender,
AM. ENTER. INST. (2013), http://www.aei.org/article/economics/financial-services/housing-fin
ance/the-fha-is-a-predatory-lender/ ("When Congress established the FHA in 1934, cross-
subsidization between low-and high-risk borrowers was explicitly prohibited.").
332 A couple of commentators have focused on this topic recently. Joseph Tracy presented
a work-in-progress, Is the FHA Producing Sustainable Homeownership?, at the 2013
Cleveland Fed Policy Summit on September 9, 2013, http://www.clevelandfed.org/communit
y-development/events/ps2013/pres al tracy-a.pdf. Joseph Tracy forecast a default rate for
the 2007 vintage in excess of 50%. Joseph Tracy, Fed. Reserve Bank of NY, Address at the
2013 Cleveland Fed. Policy Summit: Is the FHA Producing Sustainable Homeownership?
(Sept. 9, 2013). Edward Pinto, who presented on the same panel, found a foreclosure rate of
15% for FHA loans in many low-income communities. Edward Pinto, Am. Enterprise Inst.,
Address at the 2013 Cleveland Fed. Policy Summit: How the FHA Hurts Working Class
Families and Communities (Sept. 19, 2013).
333 See supra Part III.B.1-3 (detailing the conservative underwriting practices during this
time period).
334 See supra Part III.B.4-9 (explaining the riskier lending practices that led to the
current financial crisis).
335 See RYAN, supra note 205, at 92 (explaining that Section 235 was suspended and then
terminated because of the high default and foreclosure rate); HAMP Changes, supra note
271, at 1-2 (discussing the high foreclosure rate of the 2010s).
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harmed by such thoughtlessly loose underwriting criteria as they
were disproportionately represented among homeowners impacted
by the defaults and foreclosures from those failed programs. 3 6
History teaches us that the goal of sustainable homeownership
should not have been ignored.337 It should be closely followed for
the sake of the FHA's viability. It should also be closely adhered
to for the sake of FHA-insured borrowers who should be able to
rely on FHA underwriting as a signal that they will likely be able
to afford their housing payments and keep their homes.
There will always be some percentage of FIA mortgagors who
will default on their loans. The key policy question is what the
acceptable range of default is over the long term. If the rate is too
low, it would imply that some were not given the opportunity to
benefit from homeownership. If the rate is too high, it would likely
imply that an FHA mortgage was reducing household net worth
and having too many negative social impacts on households as
families deal with the effects of default, foreclosure, and eviction.
There is no objective way to identify the most ideal default rate
for FHA mortgages. One might, however, look at the alternatives
available to households. Because FHA-eligible households have
the option of renting, the benefits and drawbacks of an FA
mortgage to a household should be compared to renting as well as
to other mortgage products that might be available to them.
Researchers at the UNC Center for Community Capital argue that
homeownership beats renting in a number of ways, although their
study is drawn from a very limited number of homeowners with
mortgages from a particular loan program, the Community
Advantage Program (CAP).338
336 See Gottlieb, supra note 223 (detailing a real estate scam in the 1980s targeting
minorities).
337 See generally supra Part III.B (providing a historical overview of the FHA's risky
underwriting process and its effects).
338 UNC CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, supra note 307, at 1-4 (studying Community Advantage
Program portfolio of 46,000 home-purchase mortgages over a ten year period). Having
earlier reviewed the relevant literature about the social benefits of homeownership, Reiss,
supra note 324, at 805-18 (discussing the alleged benefits of homeownership), I am
skeptical of such one-sided claims about the value of homeownership, although some studies
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The UNC researchers found that ownership provides a greater
financial cushion than renting for low-income families. Most
important for my purposes, they found that the loans in their
study "[were] notable for their high loan-to-value ratios: 97 percent
is the typical maximum loan-to-value ratio, though some programs
issue loans all the way up to 103 percent of house value."339
They concluded that "having received assistance toward one's
down payment and closing costs has no significant effect
whatsoever on CAP homeowners' mortgage performance." 340 The
authors of the study noted some "important caveats" in their
findings that severely limit their generalizability. 341
support a finding that homeownership does have positive financial impacts on households.
See, e.g., Christopher E. Herbert et al., Is Homeownership Still an Effective Means of
Building Wealth for Low-Income and Minority Households?, in HOMEOWNERSHIP BUILT TO
LAST: BALANCING ACCESS, AFFORDABLY, AND RISK AFTER THE HOUSING CRISES 52 (Eric S.
Belsky et al. eds., 2014) ("[T]here continues to be strong support for the association between
owning a home and accumulating wealth."); QUERCIA ET AL., supra note 262, at 7 ("[S]tudies
have shown that, over time, homeowners do accumulate more wealth than their renter
counterparts.').
3'9 UNC CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, supra note 307, at 3. Even more striking,
a substantial portion of CAP's borrowers had help meeting their modest
down payment requirements and closing costs: some 38 percent of CAP
owners relied on some form of assistance beyond their own savings and
assets to buy their homes. Sellers and real estate agents were the source of
assistance most frequently cited, followed by family and friends, then
grants from community groups, government agencies or other
organizations. Two percent of owners used a second mortgage, while
another 2 percent used help from a different source altogether. Community
grants and loans were particularly important for African American
borrowers.
Id.
340 Id. at 4. See generally Allison Freeman, The Continuing Importance of Homeownership:
Evidence from the Community Advantage Program, 26 CMTY. INVESTMENTS 7, 7-9 (2014)
("CAP is an affordable-loan secondary market program that was created in 1998 in a
partnership between Self-Help, Fannie Mae, and the Ford Foundation. The loans in the CAP
portfolio are purchase money, 30-year, fixed-rate mortgages. These loans were originated not
by brokers, but by banks earning Community Reinvestment Act credit for such investments.
The vast majority of loans in the CAP portfolio were made to lower-income and minority
borrowers.").
341 UNC CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, supra note 307, at 4 ("First, not all owners fared equally
well. Some owners who bought late in the cycle in more volatile markets have lost wealth.
Second, the experience of the CAP homeowners cannot be generalized to all lower-income
borrowers over this same period because the type of financing used is a key determinant of
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I am cautious of assuming that the FHA's results with low
downpayments would be the same as CAP's given the significant
differences between the two programs. But CAP's results do, at
least, suggest that we do not yet know how low downpayments can
go while still maintaining an acceptable level of mortgage defaults.
Combining the UNC study with Quercia et al.'s (also affiliated
with UNC) benefit ratio discussed above, we can reasonably
identify a range of 3% to 5% downpayments as a starting point for
FHA underwriting, and assume that future performance data
could push that range lower over time. We can also imagine that a
more sophisticated underwriting process could allow for trade-offs
among LTV, credit score, and debt-to-income (DTI) that could push
that range even lower for select borrowers. 342
B. THE TECHNICAL APPROACH
There are two approaches that the FHA could take to achieve
its three goals. It could propose a simple, conservative
underwriting model that will reduce the likelihood that the FHA
would ever need a bailout. Such a model would likely have hard
cut offs for downpayment size, LTV ratio, and credit scores. The
problem with this approach is that it is likely to exclude some
borrowers who have a reasonable likelihood of not defaulting on
their loan. This approach would be consistent with the FHA's
behavior during its early years, but it would require a firmer
commitment to conservative underwriting criteria than the FHA
has shown over the last fifty years. 343
the financial trajectory of investing in a home. All of the owners in the CAP portfolio
received fixed-rate, fixed-payment, standardized, competitively priced, long-term
mortgages. It is largely due to the durability of their affordable mortgages that CAP's
owners have enjoyed the benefits traditionally associated with homeownership, even
against a backdrop of economic upheaval. Borrowers who used costlier, riskier products
were not as fortunate and many have lost their homes as a result.").
342 High DTI ratios, for instance, may be justified by a variety of mitigating factors, such as a
high net worth. See DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 7, at 136 (listing mitigating factors).
343 See supra Part III.B (discussing the conservative underwriting of the 1930s and the
riskier standards that arose in the 1960s).
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Alternatively, it could attempt to construct a dynamic default
model like those used in the rest of the modern lending industry
that attempts to expand access to credit to its reasonable limits.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, for instance, both use automated
underwriting software to pre-screen loans for eligibility for
purchase by the companies. 344 Such an approach risks exposing
the FHA to insolvency-and the federal government to liability for
another bailout-if the model is pushed too far or if market
conditions make the model outdated. It has certainly been a
double-edged sword for other lenders that have relied upon it. 345
This choice between clear and simple rules on the one hand and
a flexible set of guidelines on the other is, of course, just a
particular example of the classic choice between rules and
standards at the heart of many policy decisions.346 Nonetheless, it
poses a hard choice in this specific case. The clear and simple
rules may be easy to understand and comply with but may be
under- and over-inclusive in their application. 347 The dynamic
model could, like a vague standard, be more costly to create and to
get buy-in from the regulated parties (the originating lenders).348
A technocrat would favor the latter as it would appear to maximize
the social utility of the FHA. A cynical observer of the political
scene might not be so sure that such a textured approach could
survive for long amid the jockeying of special interests.
C. POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
The commentators who have lost faith in the FHA's ability to
stay the course of responsible underwriting have had good
34 Reiss, supra note 1, at 939 (discussing innovations which allow the companies to
expand into other markets).
345 See id. at 939 n. 157 (noting the risks of innovation in the private sector).
346 See generally Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A- Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
347 See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 68
(1983) (identifying "transparency, accessibility, and congruence" as aspects of "precise" rules).
348 See id. at 73-74 (identifying costs and benefits to changing the rules).
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reason.349  Congress has shown itself to put politics ahead of
responsible underwriting to disastrous effect.350 But given the
long history of the FHA, it seems the commentators are, perhaps,
too pessimistic. Indeed, their aversion to policy experimentation
by the FHA is consistent with a broader aversion to government
social policy expenditures, an aversion that reverberates in just
about every federal election throughout the country in recent
years. All social policy can be done irresponsibly. All of it can lose
or waste money or have unintended consequences. In my eyes,
there is nothing about the FHA that is particularly flawed as an
instrument of government action. 351 However, the FHA can be
abused and is, in fact, occasionally abused-sometimes by
Congressional mandate.
This is not to say that we have nothing to learn from the FHA's
critics. The FHA should be constrained from repeating the errors
of its past. Odysseus tied himself to the mast of his ship when
passing the isle of the Sirens to both hear their beautiful song and
to keep himself from jumping into the wine-dark sea.3 52 At the
same time, he made his sailors plug up their ears with beeswax so
that they would not feel the pull of the Sirens' song and throw
themselves into that same wine-dark sea.353 And so Congress
could tie itself to a strong underwriting standard by returning to
the "economic soundness" standard of the pre-1950s FHA.354
Congress could also mandate that the FHA implement an
appropriate benefit ratio through a rulemaking process. The
rulemaking would protect the FHA from loose underwriting just as
the beeswax protected Odysseus' men. There is, of course, always
34.) See supra Part II (describing the ebb and flow of the FHA's underwriting standards
from the 1930s to the present).
350 See supra Part III.B.5 (discussing the FHA's disastrous 1970s).
351 I would contrast my position here with the one I take on the fatally flawed
public/private hybrids, Fannie and Freddie. See generally Reiss, supra note 1 (arguing that
Fannie and Freddie should be terminated in their current form).
352 Homer, The Odyssey, in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 251-52 (Robert
Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952).
353 Id.
354 See FED. HOUS. ADNMN., supra note 173, para. 101 (noting that the National Housing Act
stipulated that "no mortgage shall be accepted for insurance unless it is economically sound").
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the risk that Congress would reverse itself, but-hey-that's
democracy. If Odysseus refuses to bind himself to the mast, there
is no one to save him from himself.
And if Congress finds that there are categories of households
which are still not adequately accessing the mortgage markets, it
would need to increase the cross-subsidy elements of the FHA
insurance premium or allocate funds to subsidize them directly.
Although increasing direct subsidies through Congressional action
may be infeasible in the current political environment, increasing
cross-subsidies may be done administratively.
The more sophisticated approach to underwriting which looks
at the layering of risks like credit score, loan-to-value ratio, debt-
to-income ratio, and other factors may, in theory, result in a more
socially optimal level of lending. 55 Our worries do not disappear,
however, merely because we undertake a rulemaking initiative
that implements a dynamic underwriting standard.
Notwithstanding all of the benefits of a dynamic approach, a
measured political analysis might suggest that there is good
reason to stick with an easy-to-understand heuristic like a
mandatory 3%-5% downpayment requirement. Such a
requirement would be harder for homeowners, lenders, and
politicians seeking to be "pro-homeowner" to manipulate, in
contrast to the dynamic rule. That dynamic rule is always going to
be subject to pressures from lenders looking to increase market
share and politicians who put pressure on regulated financial
institutions to expand access to credit for a variety of politically
expedient reasons.
355 Default risk "rises exponentially with each additional high-risk factor in" a loan.
DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 7, at 127 (emphasis in the original). This practice is
referred to as "risk stacking." Id. Risk-based pricing can also account for compensating
factors that reduce risk, such as a demonstrated "ability to accumulate savings." GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 69, at 10-11.
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V. CONCLUSION
The FHA has been a versatile tool of government since it was
created in the 1930s, achieving a variety of social purposes
through its mortgage insurance programs. However, it can fail
when the goals to which it is put are muddled. There is no doubt
that today's FHA is suffering from many of the same unrealistic
underwriting assumptions that have derailed so many subprime
lenders, as well as Fannie and Freddie. It had also been harmed,
like other lenders, by a housing market as bad as any seen since
the Great Depression.
Commentators on the FHA have rightly brought attention to the
risks of FHA programs that fail to underwrite its products
appropriately. They are right that the FHA needs to be bailed out
because of this failed underwriting practice. These commentators
have therefore concluded that the FHA is not particularly good at
achieving its social policy objectives. They call for a more limited
role for the FHA, one that focuses on liquidity and stability and
leaves innovative approaches to expanding homeownership behind.
These commentators do not, however, fully appreciate the
extent to which modest downpayment requirements and
responsible underwriting can drive the success of new FRA
initiatives. Central to any analysis of the FHA's role is an
understanding of its policies relating to downpayment size. Much
of the FHA's performance is driven by its downpayment
requirements, which have trended ever downward so that
homeowners were able to get loans for 100% of the value of the
house in recent years. But as is obvious to all, the larger the
downpayment, the safer the loan, if everything else is equal.
What has been less obvious to policy makers is that tiny or
nonexistent downpayments are unacceptably risky. Given that
the FHA insures 100% of the losses on its mortgages, the
downpayment requirement is a key driver of its performance.
Empirical researchers should continue to study how low
downpayment requirements can go while still maintaining an
acceptable benefit ratio for FHA mortgages. At this point, a
downpayment in the range of 3% to 5% seems appropriate, but one
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could contemplate that number being responsibly pushed lower
over time, within a rulemaking context. One could also
contemplate a sophisticated approach that might allow for lower
downpayments for those with stronger credit histories or other
strengths in their underwriting profiles. This approach would
require an underwriting system that was relatively insulated from
politics.
It seems too simple to conclude by saying that although it is
important to make residential credit broadly available, the FHA
will not be doing borrowers any favors if their loans are not
sustainable and they end up in default or foreclosure. But simply
put, in the past the FHA has not always balanced the goal of
access to credit with the goal of sustainable credit. It should,
however, plan on always keeping that balance in mind going
forward. In that way, it can make homeownership available to
households who could reasonably expect to maintain it over the
long term.

